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ABSTRACT
Water Policy and Theoretical Models: Political, Bureaucratic and Class
Dynamics in a Growth Economy explores the three major socio-political theories of the
state and public policy: pluralism, elite/managerialism and class-dialecticism using a case
study o f a series of policy decisions and outcomes during the period from 1989 to 1995
related to the Las Vegas Valley Water District which serves Las Vegas, Nevada. This
time period is important due to the unprecedented levels of population growth
experienced in the Las Vegas Valley and due to the extreme scarcity of water resources.
This case study explores the issues of popular politics, bureaucratic and elite organization
and class imperatives as played out in the development of public water policy by the Las
Vegas Valley Water District.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

When the average person thinks of water, what comes to mind? When a person is
filling his or her swimming pool, is he or she thinking about democratic principles or
liberty and freedom? When he or she is opening the tap to wash his or her hands, is he or
she wondering about the impartiality of bureaucracy and its technological rationality?
When he or she is driving out to the newer parts of town, sipping spring water from a
sports bottle, is he or she considering the price of new water versus old water to
ratepayers? When flushing the toilet, is our average citizen thinking about politics?
Probably not But a case can be made that our average citizen should be thinking about
water as a social issue, an economic issue and, most certainly, a political issue.
To more clearly understand the socio-political and economic links among natural
resource use, public policy and institutional paradigms, I will examine the factors leading
to a shift in water policy in the Las Vegas area. This shift led to the adoption of an
Integrated Resource Planning model or IRP by the Las Vegas Valley Water District
working in conjunction with the Southern Nevada Water Authority (SNWA). I will
examine the actions and policies of the Las Vegas Valley Water District (the District)
during the period of 1989 to 1995 in order to test the explanatory power of three major
political theoretical perspectives: Pluralist, Elite/Managerial and Class-based. By doing
1
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this, I hope to develop a nuanced framework by which complex and multi-levelled policy
decisions can be imderstood. By testing a series o f decisions and outcomes related to a
single agency, the Las Vegas Valley Water District, I hope to reveal the changing
dynamics and stable trends in this policy arena. In order to investigate this topic, I
attended public meetings, interviewed Las Vegas Valley Water District staff members,
consulted technical documents provided by the District, and gleaned information from
newspaper articles and other secondary sources. By comparing past policy with the
present and by asking who participated in policy decisions, whose ideas held sway and to
whom the benefits accrued, I will examine the current state of public policy with regard
to water resources in the southern Nevada region.
This case study provides an excellent opportunity to test and refine political and
sociological understanding of public policy centered on a natural resource for many
reasons. First, the Las Vegas Valley is experiencing unprecedented levels o f population
growth. This means that bureaucratic and economic interests will be moving more
quickly than normal policy cycles. This rapid growth offers a chance to examine policy
consequences in a short period. Second, because the economic interests are split
between only two major industries, the resort industry and the construction/real estate
industry, this case study provides the opportunity to examine the impact of economic
interests and conflicts within dominant economic segments. Third, I will be analyzing a
series of policy decisions and their outcomes directed by the largest local water provider
in Las Vegas, the Las Vegas Valley Water District. Lastly, the Las Vegas Valley
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exemplifies the West’s precarious dependence upon a particular legal and social
construction o f water as well as technological intervention in order to provide water
supplies.
However, technological policy is also social policy. The environment is a social
construct with social, political and economic components. Public policy regarding water
involves issues of social equity and values. It has a political aspect because control o\ er
the direction o f water policy speaks to the overall balance and direction of power within
and between the various social institutions and political organizations and actors. Water
policy reflects economic trends because the distribution and use of water affects different
industries differently as well as affecting people differently depending on their socio
economic standing in the community.

WATER POLICY IN THE LAS VEGAS VALLEY

The Las Vegas Valley Water District is operating in a fast-changing community.
Over the past ten years, more people have moved to the Southern Nevada, in which Las
Vegas is the largest city, than almost any other region (PMCL 1992). It has been widely
reported through print and local television news outlets that over 5,000 people a month
poured over the state line to seek a new life in Southern Nevada. In June of 1995 alone,
6,169 people turned in out-of-state drivers licenses for a Nevada license according to the
University of Nevada Las Vegas’ Center for Business and Economic Research (Caruso
1995: ID). Water demand forecasting is based on a combination of water supply, current
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usage and population projections. According to District staff members, past population
projections were proving inadequate (staff interviews). In 1989, it was against this
rapidly changing backdrop that the District found it necessary to rethink not only its
policy projections, but its policy model as well.
Up to 1989, the District followed a supply-oriented policy model that did not
include a strong public presence in decision making or goal setting. A supply-oriented
policy means that the District pursued and managed supplies of water without or with
minimal management of demand for water such as instituting conservation measures.
The District has two main sources for water supply: ground and surface water rights
within the state and Nevada’s allotment of Colorado River water. When the District
revised its population estimates and determined that additional water supplies would be
needed to meet future population growth, it proceeded from that finding to file for
unallocated rights to ground and surface water in 26 basins located in central and eastern
Nevada (Pappa 1990a:5E). The District named this plan, the Cooperative Water Project.
While the actions of the District were ostensibly legal under state law which allows for
beneficial use of any unappropriated ground or surface waters in the state, opponents
chiefly from the effected central and eastern counties and from environmental groups
such as Citizens Alert were vocal and intense. These opponents dubbed the District’s
plan the “Water Grab” (Pappa 1990a: IE) and raised the specter of the Owens Valley in
California, a small rural area which was devastated when the city of Los Angeles diverted
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its water supplies to meet the needs of Los Angeles’ growing metropolitan area (Reisner
1986:see chapter two).
By 1995, the District had pushed the Cooperative Water Project to the back
burner, taken part in the formation of regional water authority known as the Southern
Nevada Water Authority (SNWA), secured additional supplies of Colorado River water,
adopted a demand-side policy model known as Integrated Resource planning and
assembled a citizens action committee to proceed on developing general policy goals for
the entire region of Southern Nevada known as the Integrated Resource Planning
Advisory Committee (IRPAC). The IRPAC members recommended to the SNWA Board
that a new Treatment and Transmission Facility (TTF) be constructed to accommodate
new supplies o f Colorado River water.
What do these policy actions tell us about the politics of water in Southern
Nevada? Was the shift in policy due to a vigorous and open competition between interest
groups such as environmental activists, rural groups and ratepayers organizations? Do the
policy decisions reflect bureaucratic and economic elite control of public policy? Was
the District reacting to the dictates of the “growth machine” - developers, construction
firms, real estate speculators, gaming interests, etc. - to provide more water for an
increasing population base? Do the policy decisions demonstrate the need to address
latent class conflict? Was the District acting in a way to mitigate the negative impacts of
growth upon the subordinate classes? By answering those questions, I hope to expose the
dynamics of public policy in the Las Vegas Valley with regard to water policy and the
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circumstances of expansive economic and population growth. Each of these questions
touches upon a different level of theoretical concern and community power.

THE STUDY

The study itself will track and analyze a series o f policy decisions and outcomes
involving the Las Vegas Valley Water District during the years of 1989 to 1995. Each
policy step will be used to test the predictive and explanatory powers of each of the three
major theoretical perspectives (pluralist, elite/managerial and class-dialectic). This
multi-theoretical approach should not only capture the particulars of this specific policy
setting, but should also highlight the strengths and weaknesses of each theoretical model.
By constructing the study in this way, I will attempt to offer suggestions for refining
future studies of complex, fast-paced local policy which involves a natural resource such
as water.
In Chapter 2, I will delve into the theoretical and methodological questions at the
heart of my research. I will discuss the basic tenets of pluralist, elite/managerial and
class-based perspectives. Each perspective carries its own set of prerogatives and each
perspective highlights a different level of power within the policy arena. Power can be
expressed on different levels: the individual, bureaucratic/organizational and
institutional level. And different analytic tools will uncover evidence of power
distribution in a given policy issue. However, rather than seeing community power as
captured by any one of those levels, I feel that it is important to examine all three levels
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in order gain a greater insight into the complexity of policy factors. The pluralist
perspective focuses on the individual at the unit o f analysis and derives its power from
the examination of specific actors and specific decisions involved in a given policy.
Pluralist theorists predict that political power will be dispersed throughout the
community, available to any interested individuals or groups. The elite/managerial
perspective concentrates on the organization as the unit of analysis and predicts that
policy will be the result of bureaucratic and economic elite control through the exercise
of elite organizations. The class-based perspective works at the systemic level of
analysis. This theoretical perspective predicts that it is at the institutional level where
policy is formed, that the institutions of oin society are biased toward certain outcomes
favoring dominant economic interests. However this perspective also holds that due to
the contradictions arising between the different institutions, subordinate interests will
also be incorporated into the policy process. I will discuss studies of urban policy and
resource agency policy that have come before, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses
of the approaches to the material. I will also layout the methods by which I conducted
this research.
In Chapter 3 ,1 will discuss the history of water policy in the West. Because water
supplies are so scarce in the West compared to the East, water issues have been a central
part of public policy in the Western states. The West has developed different legal,
social and economic constructions of water than exist in the East. The laws that have
developed over the years regarding water policy contain many contradictory mandates.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

8
Most Western water law promotes economic use of water, but historically that use has
been confined to agriculture and mining practices. Water remaining in a stream or
aquifer providing for aquatic life or for wildlife was not considered an economically
beneficial use. Since the 1970s the environmental movement has brought increasing
attention to the protection of non-human lifeforms and structures regardless of their
economic value. Knowing the history of water policy in the West will illuminate issues
still at the center of debate in the study of water policy in the Las Vegas Valley.
In Chapter 4 , 1will lay out the findings of my research which support or refute the
policy models discussed in Chapter 2. I will track the players and the policy decisions
beginning with the Cooperative Water Project ending with the decision to build a new
Treatment and Transmission Facility (TTF) to serve the Las Vegas Valley. Those
findings will describe the fruits of my research as well as shed light on the effectiveness
of the various models in terms of their ability to capture and predict the dynamics of
public policy outcomes.
In Chapter 5 ,1will present the conclusions that I have drawn from this research.
Also, I will explore any issues that require further inquiry, such as the treatment of the
environment within social policy models. Here the treatment of the theoretical models
and the issues involved in the research o f this topic should be clear and add to the
understanding of public policy.
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CHAPTER 2

THEORY AND METHODS

Theoretical and Methodological Concerns
The policy history of the Las Vegas Valley Water District during the period of
1989 to 1995 presents an opportunity to test the three major socio-political theories, the
pluralist, elite/managerial and class-based paradigms, for their explanatory power
regarding the factors that led up to the District’s policy change. Each theory follows from
particular worldview and each has significant consequences for theory and methods. The
goal of social research is not only to understand political and social policy, but to
discover how policy affects society and how it could be changed to better serve society.
The mark of a potent social theory is the degree to which it provides the researcher with
adequate analytical tools to understand clearly social phenomena and to develop
mechanisms for dealing with social and political realities.

Pluralist Models
The pluralist paradigm holds that democratic mechanisms such as formalized
access to the political process in the form of voting rights and other similar measures
ensures that the state will act as a neutral arbiter o f the interests and needs of the general

10
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public. Pluralism focuses on the agency and actions o f individuals. Interest group
organization and other voluntary associations dictate the priority of issues and the
composition of interested parties. Also, it is assumed that all groups and individuals have
an equal opportunity to present their positions within the public policy framework. If the
pluralist view of public policy holds, over time competition among interest groups will
reflect the needs of the general public. This model assumes that in individual cases,
outcomes will reflect compromise between various groups.
The pluralist worldview is that the individual is key to understanding social and
political processes in the United States. Pluralists see the democratic traditions in the
United States as promoting political and social expression across economic standing in
the community. What people cannot affect as individuals they can change through
membership in voluntary associations and organizations. The degree to which these
memberships and interests will overlap ensures that no one set o f interests dominate the
political and social landscape.
Alford and Friedland (1985) outline the assumptions underlying pluralist models:
(1) there must be “reasonably consistent and stable economic growth” with benefits
fairly distributed and a sense of opportunity throughout society; (2) there must be “access
to information” so that alternatives and consequences can be understood and reasonable
choices can be made before attempting to influence elected officials; (3) “bureaucracies
must be responsive” to elected officials and accountable to public and political opinion;
and (4) there must be a cultural element, in that the political culture of a democratic
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society “must be one of moderation” (53-4, italics in original). Further, Alford and
Friedland (1985) argue that “pluralists recognize a tension between consensus and
participation” (54). The exercise of individual rights and preferences is key to
understanding participation in the policy arena for pluralists.
Research in the pluralist tradition examines actual political and social decisions,
the decisionmakers and the outcomes o f those decisions. This methodology tends to
ignore or downplay the larger institutional constraints which may suppress some
alternatives and groups of people altogether. This theory is closely tied a view that
asserts that democratic institutions hold sway and locates its strength in paying attention
to empirical evidence and agency as seen in actual policy decisions and outcomes.

Elite/Managerial Models
The elite/managerial approach emphasizes the rationalization of society as it
grows more and more complex. This complexity leads to hierarchical organization of
society based on the dictates o f expertise, specialization and impersonal service based on
legal rights and rules rather than personal bias. This approach recognizes elite control of
the policy process, discounting democratic institutions as increasingly irrelevant in the
face o f capital and knowledge monopolies.
Theorists in the elite/managerial school hold that the complexity of modem life
has unseated the primacy of democratic institutions and replaced it with bureaucratic
organizations. The expertise required to analyze and make decisions of policy in this
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technologically advanced society precludes the involvement of the general public. The
policy process becomes increasingly rational, that is, decisions are made based upon the
directives of expertise and the impersonality of bureaucracy. As Alford and Friedland
(1985) emphasize, “Organizational goals are strategic choices and do not reflect societal
values” (162).
Some theorists working within the managerial school emphasize the domination
of a class of bureaucratic and economic elites in public policy both through the control of
information and the control of economics (Mills 1956; Domhoff 1978). Economic
interests join together with bureaucratic forces to assure that policy favors their projects.
Some theorists such as Pareto and Mosca have felt that elites have always and will
always direct society with or without the complexity of modem life. They feel that the
general public is unable or unwilling to shoulder the responsibility of directing public
policy. Other theorists such as C. Wright Mills see elite domination of bureaucracy and
the economy as an effort to shut out the general public and to justify social inequities.
Theorists such as C. Wright Mills and G. William Domhoff have “helped to build a
sociology of the capitalist class, [they] have pierced the veil of legitimacy” hanging over
state institutions (Gold, Lo and Wright, 1975:34). By ferreting out the overlaps and
interlocks on social, political and economic levels they have begun to establish the
existence and workings of a dominant class tied directly to the capitalist mode of
production. Researchers using instrumentalists approaches have established a class in the
classical Marxist sense - that is, “[a] class consist[ing] of all those individuals who share
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a similar relationship to the property or the means of production” (Szymanski, 1978:27).
Alford and Friedland (1985) summarize the tension between rationalization and elite
domination, “To the extent that bureaucratic agencies successfully insulate themselves
from ‘political processes,’ the logic of rationalization may well apply. If the bureaucracy
has become politicized. . . then rationalization is mainly an elite ideology rather than a
set of rules governing the internal behavior of the organization” (180).
If this position holds, the factors leading up to the District’s policy changes would
reflect the influence of expertise and rationalization of society. Therefore, this theory
holds that policy is the product of elite control. Methods deriving from this view tend to
concentrate on analyzing bureaucratic involvement in the policy process. The methods
issuing from this branch of managerial theory concentrates on exposing the links between
technological expertise and economic demands, such as reputational studies which seek
to establish an elite network or class of bureaucratic and economic leaders guiding public
policy toward the needs of their interests (Hunter, Domhoff). These methods tend to
overlook the degree to which political processes can constrain bureaucratic actions.

Class-Dialectic Models
The class perspective holds that policy decisions are biased in favor of capitalists
or of capitalist interests. This perspective uses institutions as the unit of analysis.
Research concentrates on the system and how it perpetuates itself and not upon the
individuals of a given society and their organizations. The state is not neutral in political
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dealings and the ability of everyday individuals to affect political change through the
political system is unlikely. According to Gold et al. (1975), “Marxist theories of the
state generally answer two complementary questions; ‘Why does the state serve the
interests of the capitalist system and how does the state function to maintain and expand
the capitalist system?’” (31-2). As Szymanski asserts, there are five ways in which the
state functions to embody the interests o f capitalism;
1. It operates to preserve class relations through enforcement and codification of
laws.
2. It makes capital accumulation and profit legitimate and regulates the labor
force to ensure them.
3. It secures legitimacy through socialization in schools, in the promotion of
nationalism and in the formal governmental practices such as voting.
4. It reconciles the diverse interests of the capital class to promote a unified
program supportive of the capitalist structure while incorporating some
interests o f other classes through largely regulatory functions o f the Congress
and other agencies.
5. Finally, it collects taxes and other funds to maintain its bureaucracy and other
apparatus needed to carry out the first four functions. (Szymanski, 1978:25).

With those questions and arguments in mind, three basic perspectives have
developed in the Marxist tradition: the instrumentalist, the structuralist and the HegelianMarxist. Each perspective focuses on its own tack of theory and methodology
(instrumentalists focus on the government as an “instrument” of the ruling class, the
structuralists examine how the mode of production “structures” people rather than how
individuals or collectivities act through the state, and Hegelian-Marxist concentrate upon
the state’s function of legitimization through ideology and socialization), but the
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commonality running through all three is the component of class and its relation to the
means o f production (Gold et al. 1975:31-4).
While there have been debates between the three main branches of Marxist
thought, if the Marxist or class-based theory holds, the policy shift will come in the
service o f the capital class and mark less of a significant change in overall policy
direction than further step in legitimating this service to the capital class. Class-based
theory perceives the public policy as dictated by the demands o f the dominant mode of
production. In the United States, that dominant mode is capitalism. The methods
flowing from this theoretical position focus on making apparent the systemic constraints
or institutional biases which reinforce the dominant mode o f production in a given
society and its public policies. The methods which follow from this perspective include
historical comparison to study institutional trends over time and across cultures. The
strength o f this theoretical position is its attention to larger issues beyond individuals and
their isolated decisions. The weakness of this perspective is its extreme level of
abstraction. Theorists speak o f capital “doing” things, when in fact, despite the
probability of institutional and systemic constraints, empirical evidence identifies actors
and agents o f organizations as actually doing things.
The above theories and the case studies which follow fi-om them all illustrate, not
only their theoretical perspective, methods and objectives; but also, how each tackles
power at a different level. Pluralists concern themselves with power on the individual
level in a given situation, managerial theorists examine power as exercised by

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17
organizations and class theorists contend with systemic issues beyond the actions of
individuals acting alone or together in an interest group or the outcomes of public
agencies or political organizations. Political power is dynamic and although it appears to
be concentrated behind the interests o f some over others, it is still diffuse enough to defy
easy categorization.
Moreover, it is vital to test broad theoretical perspectives against the imperatives
of a local context. Las Vegas is located in a state which provides not only the institution
of the popular vote, but also the referendum assuring that many issues of public policy
will go directly before the voters of the state for resolution. This political climate offers
insights into the pluralist contention that public policy is largely reflective o f the
preferences and values of the general public. The scarcity of water and the high degree
of technology involved in its delivery speak to issues of bureaucratic rationality and elite
control of a precious resource. The booming economy in the Las Vegas Valley lends
itself to the discussion class conflict issues, such as whether governmental agencies serve
the general public through their policies or the growth industries and if there are signs of
class conflict in ascending economies.

CASE STUDIES OF LOCAL POLICY ISSUES
AND THEIR LIMITATIONS

Pluralist case studies, such as the classic study of power in New Haven done by
Robert Dahl (1961), set the tone for much research along and against pluralist lines
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(Alford and Friedland 1985; Kleniewski 1982), see the political system as open to any
legitimate, interested party. That decisions issuing from public forums, such as publiclyowned utilities or legislative bodies, do not necessarily conform to the majority opinion
in the strictest sense, does not negate their democratic nature or their public benefit as a
good source of policy (Camoy 1984:36 -8). By asking who participated and who decided
and what the actual outcomes of the policy process were, pluralists demonstrate, not so
much a picture o f power in the abstract, but a picture of power as exercised by a group of
individuals or organizations who participated based on self-interest and without state
authority.
The District has always had to answer to publicly elected officials with regard to
their policy by appealing to legislative bodies for changes in laws and codes and by
conforming to the legislative dictates from the federal to local levels o f government. The
adoption of the Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) model lends itself well to testing
pluralist perspective. IRP model stresses management of demand, meaning management
of use of water resources and also the IRP model emphasizes the importance
incorporating the public into the policy process through the adoption of a Citizens
Advisory Committee. However, in order to understand how beneficial a given policy is,
or is not to an area, more research and theoretical attention needs to be paid to the
reasons why some segments of the community did and did not participate. Also, studying
only one policy decisions and outcome in isolation may not thoroughly capture all the
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forces at work behind a given policy. Pluralist methods alone will not uncover structural
dynamics that may benefit certain groups.
A recent study from a managerial perspective produced by Daniel lacofano that
takes into account many similar circumstances and issues as concern this study of the
District’s policy shift and touches upon issues of public participation and
bureaucratic/elite control. He assembled a group of case studies that center on public
participation and policy decision making. His work is a source on environmental policy
making and examines the same players seen in the Las Vegas Valley Water District’s IRP
process: elected officials, agency experts and the public. lacofano examines the link
between public involvement and agency direction to measure the success of the policy
process against the stated goals of the agencies. The major goals lacofano (1990)
identified were information exchange, public interest group representation, public
interest mediation and acceptability and agency responsiveness (15). lacofano examines
the stated goals o f an agency and measures to degree to which public input drives policy
formation or merely ratifies what the agency had planned all along. The benefit in these
activities is a good measure of political acceptability. “Even if the public ends up
playing only a watchdog role and merely re-affirms public agency decisions, there is
some evidence to suggest that the resulting decisions will have greater public
acceptability” (lacofano 1990:126).
Many of lacofano findings were supported in studies of water policy and public
involvement by Prasifka (1988) and Pierce and Doerksen (1976). These studies
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examined the increasing use of Citizen’s Action Committees (CACs) in the policy arena.
Both found that despite the involvement of citizens in the policy process, the process was
still dominated by the bureaucracy or agency initiating the process. While Prasifka found
that bureaucracies do pay close attention to pluralistic values when assembling the CACs,
by and large, these three researchers found that CACs were carefully managed by the
agencies involved. Prasifka (1988) stated that “Public involvement is usually limited to
discussing policy alternatives already defined by the agency” (232). Pierce and Doerksen
(1976) concurred, “If CAC members are chosen by the policy makers, the definition of
the public is likely a function of the policy makers’ perceptions of the community’s
important issues” (12).
These studies were conducted before the Integrate Resource Planning (IRP)
model was developed for water utilities and this case study allows for comparisons of the
IRPAC findings to those of the CACs studied by lacofano, Prasifka and Pierce and
Doerksen. While lacofano, Prasifka and Pierce and Doerksen deftly organize public
participation schemes, they do not take into account issues of inequalities of political or
economic power among participants. Since these studies rely heavily upon
elite/managerial assumptions, they do not adequately explain why resource agencies and
utilities would want to use a public advisory committee. Prasifka (1988) argues, these
bureaucracies do not like public participation models because they lose political leverage
in the process and take on additional time and expense to come to decision but also
argues that “[pjublic involvement is usually limited to discussing policy alternatives
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already defined by the agency” (231-2). He never challenges the elite/managerial model
that might point either to pluralist pressure group explanations or to class-based findings
of systemic contradictions for why bureaucracies would choose such unfavorable
positions.
The class perspective has inspired a great number of case studies of economic and
political power. Other class-oriented studies examine many of the same mix of issues
that are at the heart of this study of policy in the Las Vegas area. Those issues of the
promotion of economic growth through the development of public infrastructure are
prominent.
One such case study is offered by Nancy Kleniewski. She fashions a compromise
between the instrumentalist and structuralist (or class struggle model as she refers to it)
in her case study of urban renewal policies in Philadelphia. Her analysis follows in the
tradition of power structure research begun by Dahl and continued, although from a
class-based perspective, by figures such as Domhoff and Whitt (Kleniewski 1987:32) In
order to examine the links between urban renewal projects and the power structure of
Philadelphia she asks the following questions to focus her theoretical concerns and drive
her research analysis:
1) Was urban renewal initiated by a political elite or an economic elite (and for
political or economic ends)?
2) Were the business leaders that supported urban renewal representative of
business as a whole or of some segments? Which?
3) If fragmented, was the local business community coordinated? How?
(Kleniewski 1987:34 )
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By studying the history o f urban renewal policy in Philadelphia, Kleniewski
(1987) concludes that “It is difficult - and misleading - to make too rigid a distinction
between the political and economic groups involved in urban policy formation” (50).
Policy was driven by a pro-growth coalition of varied businesses and political leaders.
She notes that financial and legal interests dominated and that conflict between business
elites was managed through inner circle mechanisms such as the Chamber of Commerce.
The political climate of Kleniewski’s Philadelphia is similar to that of Las Vegas.
Financial and development interests are taking an active part in the decision making
process as members of the Citizen’s Advisory Committee (IRPAC) for the District. Also,
growth is a central driver for the Las Vegas economy. However, her analytical
fiamework does not take into account the interaction of the public as ratepayers or as
voters concerned both with maintaining low taxes and with maintaining environmental
quality through the support of environmental legislation. The impact of ratepayers and
voters needs to be factored into this study. Also, Philadelphia is an older city embarking
upon renewal of its core areas. Las Vegas, by contrast, is a much newer city going
through its initial phase of development and growth.
Another study dealing with class issues and public utility policy is that of Patrick
McGuire. He studied the regulatory history of electric utilities in the United States. His
case study of regulatory developments in power utilities develops a synthesis of
instrumentalist and class struggle (structuralist) theories. McGuire (1989) points out that
critics from Theda Skocpol to Jill Quadagno “claim that instrumentalists fail to recognize
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the autonomy of class factions, state agencies, state managers and the non-elite occupants
of the bureaucracies, or the potential of intraclass struggle and interclass struggle, or even
to identify working class victories” (183). McGuire (1989) argues for a synthesis which
captures the power that capital can and does mobilize in the face of threat or challenge.
“Instrumental class power is mobilized in response to class-based struggles over a shift in
the relations of class power. It is not mobilized pro-actively for reasons of economics...
[rjather, it is mobilized and policy is created in a reactive attempt to contain a challenge
to the fundamental relations and dynamics of capital accumulation” (185). McGuire
(1989) found that his theory of instrumental power may have very limited applicability
particularly in emerging economic sectors; however, he cautions that academics and
activists need to “reconceptualize their understanding of the class-state relationship and.
. to reconsider their strategies to account for this greater flexibility and opportunity
structure in the class-state relationship” (200).
McGuire’s (1989) theory of instrumental class power discounts the involvement
of the state or of non-elite citizens in policy formation. He states that capital can
organize outside of state structures in response to class-based threats (182). His study
also focused on the largely privately-owned electrical utility industry. The dynamics of
capital accumulation extend beyond the social configuration of economies and policies.
The Las Vegas Valley Water District is a public utility and together with the
development community in Las Vegas work against a backdrop of water scarcity which
has technological, economic and political limitations.
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J. Allen Whitt offers a class-based model with a nuanced methodological
approach. Because it is reasonable to find interest group participation, instances of
bureaucratic expertise and direction and class interests expressed in the course of an
examination of any policy process, Whitt develops a theoretical strategy to address the
important issues in each theoretical perspective. In his book Urban Elites and Mass
Transportation: The Dialectics o f Power (1982), Whitt examines a number of mass
transportation campaigns in California and tests the observations in these case studies
against the tenets of pluralist, elite/managerial and class-dialectical theory in order to
explain the workings of the various campaigns to the fullest degree.
Whitt sees the class-dialectic as having been neglected with regard to studies of
local political activity. Whitt feels it is vital to clarify the differing political theories and
their models in order to better understand not only the aims of his study, but more
importantly, to understand how political power and dominant interests affect public
policy and the daily lives o f ordinary people. “The class-dialectic model suggests that the
ruling class is generally well-served by the institutions of capitalist society, but that the
class does not have the capability of invariably having things its way because of the web
of contradictory needs with which it must contend” (Whitt, 1982:26-7). In other words,
the dominant economic class may benefit, or even hold positions of power, but they will
not always win all individual decisions because the dialectic relationship between classes
and major social institutions is informed by contradiction and crisis.
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For Whitt, it is within the issue o f the state and its relation to dominant power that
the differences between the pluralist, managerial and class-dialectic models lie. The
pluralists hold that the state is autonomous, an arena for conflict and consensus among
non-hierarchical, competing interest groups. Whitt tends to blend the elite studies of
Domhoff and Mills together with studies of bureaucratic domination. For Whitt, the
central tenet is that whether through economic domination or bureaucratic domination,
elite and managerial perspectives predict the futility of democratic institutions. The
elite/managerial model does not allow for any autonomy of the state from capitalistic
interests or from bureaucratic rationality. Whitt (1982) argues, however that the classdialectic model does not assume either determination or autonomy on the part of the
state. The dialectic model is historically contingent and assumes that contradictions will
develop policies and actions which are in conflict (30). This conflict that arises from the
contradictions of dominant institutions and inter-and intraclass conflict are mistaken for
open competition by pluralists.
After carefully examining a number of mass transportation campaigns that had
been waged in California, Whitt argues that the key to answering the questions of why
one project was successful and another was not revolve around degrees of class
consciousness and the contradictions of capital accumulation. By using social
institutions as the basic unit o f analysis rather than the interest group o f the pluralist
model or the individual elites and agency organizations of the managerial model, Whitt
can explain and place in perspective the actions of classes and institutions that exhibit
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varying levels o f cohesion and consciousness surrounding a given issue. By examining
the contradictions that arise from policies which are generally reactive to economic
trends rather than proactive in formulating a broad-based social agenda, Whitt can
account for the disunity among capital interests that arise chiefly around the concrete
methods for achieving goals that can be mistaken under the pluralist model for a much
deeper disunity of goals.
Whitt highlights the fact that much of the development of mass transportation
projects throughout California allowed private companies to reap profits from public
expenditures. Whitt demonstrated that the mass transportation projects met the needs of
capital, and not the needs o f the public at large. The successful transportation projects
did not challenge the dominance or make inroads against the costs o f the private
automobile, instead these transportation projects were carefully orchestrated to
compliment automobile interests and provide a convenience chiefly for white collar
workers commuting from the more exclusive suburbs into the downtown financial
districts of San Francisco and Los Angeles. Unsuccessful mass transportation campaigns
tended to cut too closely into the interests and budgets of automobile interests, such as oil
companies, paving companies, etc. (Whitt 1982).
While the class-dialectic model may prove to have the greatest explanatory power
in parsing out the locus o f regional power in policy decisions, there are significant
differences, at least on the surface, between the interests and issues at play in Whitt’s
case studies of mass transportation in California and those interests and issues
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surrounding water policy in the Southern Nevada region. In California, the capital class
that Whitt studies has national and often international business ties. In Nevada, the
dominant business is the resort industry. But the construction/real estate industry is
becoming a major economic force in the valley as well and may create tensions between
class segments. While the resort industry has national and international ties, the
construction/real estate industry is more regionally and locally based. Many construction
and development companies currently vying for more water are headquartered in the
neighboring states of California, Arizona and Utah. When construction costs become too
high due to environmental regulations or scarcity of natural resources, the companies can
pull up stakes and move to the next prosperous Western boom town. Given the lack of
diversity in the local economy, the potential for “bust” is greater in Southern Nevada than
in the economy of California.
The case study of water policy in the Las Vegas Valley allows us an important
opportunity to examine inter- and intraclass conflict. Unlike Southern California which
has an older more diverse local economy, many workers in the Las Vegas area depend
upon a vibrant but limited resort and construction economy. Workers in Las Vegas may
be more likely to support the interests behind population and economic growth in the
region because they may associate their own prosperity with that of the capital class.
Theorizing along lines similar to Whitt, Alford and Friedland (1985) make a case
for a blended theoretical foundation from which to do social research that has greater
explanatory power and, thereby, contributes more to social action and democracy.
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Alford and Friedland develop a schema that examines three paradigms of social theory
and the research that follows from them. The three are the pluralist, the managerial and
the class paradigms. They build a careful argument that each of these major theoretical
foundations ignores some part of the social web to its peril. Most often, these theoretical
blind spots can be seen in the way in which units of analysis are collapsed or glossed over
in order to maintain theoretical direction. For them the problematics of studying
individuals, organizations or society as a whole are remedied by considering levels of
power in the place of levels of analysis. They “translate levels of analysis into levels of
power, using different terms to make the relationship clear. (Societal level becomes
systemic power, organizational becomes structural, individual becomes situational)”
(Alford and Friedland 1985:387).
Without the questioning of the very basic institutions and their relations and
contradictions, only very limited theoretical models and even popular rhetoric offer any
explanatory power. Once the basic institutions themselves are questioned, power can be
theorized and studied at all three levels: individual, organizational and societal. Alford
and Friedland highlight the need for integration and critique across levels of power by
summing up how power is theorized by each of the three paradigms. “‘Politics’ in the
pluralist view means a disagreement over alternative possible decisions in particular
situations, in which individuals use their resources to attempt to influence the outcome.
[...] ‘Politics’ in the managerial view means organized conflict between political ‘parties’
- relatively stable coalitions that compete for the chance to rule either the state or the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

29
organization.. . , seeking to control the bureaucratic state. [...] ‘Politics in the class
world view is not theorized directly. Insofar as the concept is theorized, politics is the
embodiment of class forces, the actions of agents of classes” (Alford and Friedland
1985:408). For Alford and Friedland, “[p]olitics . . . mediates between institutional
contradictions and human action” (1985:408-9). They point to a weakness in class theory
which tends to leave it wanting for empirical support. Although the resultant decisions
favor capitalism, those same decisions usually touch the interests of other members of
society and the source for support or domination is somewhat more diffuse than class
theorization would allow.
In discussing class perspective and the democratic state, Alford and Friedland
(1985) cite Przeworski for having made “an unusual attempt to integrate all of the levels
of analysis of the democratic state within a class perspective, dealing simultaneously not
only with societal contradictions but also with organizational strategies and differentiated
individual interests” (353). The central contradiction between capitalism and democracy
is that “participation in electoral politics is necessary if the movement for socialism is to
find mass support among workers, yet this participation seems to obstruct the attainment
o f final goals.. . . electoral participation and the creation of parties seeking and
obtaining working-class support lead to ‘consensus,’ not in the pluralist sense but in the
sense o f hegemony- a dwindling o f class consciousness, not its heightening” (Alford and
Friedland 1985:354). Alford and Friedland criticize Przeworski for ignoring the role of
bureaucracy and representation in his argument while highlighting its insights. “Thus it
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is in the genuine, individual interests of particular wage earners that capitalists continue
to make profits. As long as the democratic aspect of the state successfully individualizes
the definition and political expression of interests, capitalism is reinforced, by the very
operations o f democracy'’’ (Alford and Friedland 1985:358, italics in original).
Ultimately the goal of theory and research is to illuminate social and political
constructions so that intelligent action can be taken on the part of the researcher as a
citizen to work toward the amelioration of social and political inequities. The three
major theoretical models locate themselves in relation to the institution of democracy as
well as that of the dominant economic institution of capitalism. Pluralists feel
democracy is alive and well; elite/managerial theorists think democracy is irrelevant to
policy decision and outcomes in the face of elite/managerial control; and those working
from a class-based perspective see democracy as compromised by the dominant
economic institution of capitalism. Therefore, it is important to consider democracy as
an institution when applying these three major theoretical models.
Elmer E. Schattschneider, in his book. The Semisovereign People, makes an
interesting case for the study and theorization of democracy in America. First,
Schattschneider feels the very definition of democracy as government by the people with
its assumptions of fully informed participation is unrealistic and the source of much
cynicism and pessimism regarding American politics. “If we assume that the people
‘govern,’ it follows that the governing majority ought to know more than any majority
has ever known or ever could know... We cannot get out of the dilemma by (1) making
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a great effort to educate everyone to the point where they know enough to make these
decisions not (2) by restricting participation to the people who do know all about these
matter” (Schattschneider 1960:136). Schattschneider (1960) argues further, “[t]he
problem is not how 180 million Aristotles can run a democracy, but how we can organize
a political community of 180 million ordinary people so that it remains sensitive to their
needs. This is a problem of leadership, organization, alternatives and systems o f
responsibility and confidence'’’

italics in original).

The chief mechanism Schattschneider points to in maintaining vital democracies
is that of socializing conflict. By socialized, Schattschneider means that conflicts and
alternatives should widen the scope of public involvement. Some examples he uses are
the socialization of worker/owner conflicts. When framed systematically as a matter of
conduct by private business owners, conflicts remain private. By introducing alternatives
such as unionization and collective bargaining rights the scope of conflict widens and
takes on society-wide consequences thereby developing an interest and power for
meaningful public participation. Schattschneider (1960) adds, “Change is possible in
part because it is often imperceptible, because it is usually done in the name of
preserving the status quo” (142).
While the bulk of his argument may echo pluralism, his stress on developing
political mechanisms, not educational programs, which make alternatives and conflicting
interests apparent lead to public participation in policy making that meaningfully
addresses larger institutional questions. In this study of water policy, the possibility can
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be raised that the shift on the part of the Las Vegas Valley Water District to move from a
bureaucratically-directed, supply-side management model to one that incorporates
segments of the public in order to explore demand management options reflects the
growing socialization of conflict over the use of public water resources.
Richard Flacks is a social theorist concerned about the ability of ordinary people
to affect change in public policy. He argues in his book. Making History: The Radical
Tradition in American Life (1988), that social and political structures prohibit meaningful
public participation. Due to economic and bureaucratic institutions, the ordinary person
is not cannot afford to access the decision making process. For the ordinary citizen, the
risks involved in participation outweigh the possible rewards. Ordinary people are
restricted by their work schedules and the need to provide for themselves and their
families. By contrast, “[t]he ‘power elite’ is in the unique position of being able to
influence history while simultaneously maintaining and enhancing their own personal
lives” (Flacks 1988:6). Examining the circumstances under which ordinary citizens did
or did not become involved with any of the policy decisions may reflect the degree to
which ordinary citizens are discouraged from participating due to structural and
organizational imperatives.

METHODS AND METHODOLOGY

In order to develop a research methodology to investigate the factors behind the
policy shift undertaken by the Las Vegas Valley Water District between the years of 1989
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and 1995 I had to carefully consider which methods and methodology would best capture
the intricacies of the policy arena being studied. Whitt (1982) cites Walton (1970) to
caution that with methodology; what you are looking for is often what you see. “(T]he
kind of power structures discovered in community studies appears to be partly an artifact
of the specific methods utilized, with decisional methods tending to uncover pluralistic
structures and reputational methods finding elite power structures” (32).
While the pluralistic decisional methodology ignores alternatives that did not
become a part of the official process, the reputational methodology used by elite
researchers such as Floyd Hunter and G. William Domhoff ignores the actions and
influences of those individuals and organizations not directly not known by name to be
involved in policy decisions. The class perspective is criticized by Alford and Friedland
(1985) for lacking in empirical support. As for class-based methodology, Alford and
Friedland (1985) argue that “because the class perspective has never successfully
developed a theory of the structural and situational levels of power through which
concrete politics operates, there has been a historic disjuncture between the internal
languages and public ideologies of these politics” (419).
For each theory a number of hypotheses can be generated in order to test the
theories against the evidence gathered in the course of the case study. Whitt developed a
list of questions generated by each o f the three major theoretical perspectives:
PLURALIST HYPOTHESES. If the pluralist model is correct, the study of an
important political issues should reveal (I) the active involvement of numerous
interest groups, (2) divergent goals and interests among the groups, (3) a vigorous,
competitive relationship among the groups, (4) interests and alliances that shift
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over time, and (5) political outcomes that consistently favor no particular group
over any other.
POWER ELITIST[MANAGERIAL] HYPOTHESES. If the power elitist model is
correct, the study of any important issues should reveal (I) a high degree of elite
involvement, (2) general convergence of interest among elites, (3) elite unity and
dominance on the issue, (4) stability o f political allegiances, and (5) outcomes
that consistently favor elite interests.
CLASS-DIALECTIC HYPOTHESES. If the class-dialectic model is correct, the
study of an important political issue should reveal (1) biases of social institutions
that favor outcomes beneficial to dominant classes; (2) evidence of latent class
conflict (divergent interests) or observable class conflict over the issue, perhaps
including intraclass conflicts among the dominant class, but accompanied by
attempts to achieve class unity and cohesion; (3) political alliances and stability
of power relations that are historically contingent, reflecting the need to respond
to inter-and intraclass conflicts and structural crisis; and (4) outcomes that usually
favor dominant class interests, but may also reflect the power of opposing classes
and the limitations imposed by structural contradictions (Whitt 1982:31-2).
To make this trio of theoretical models specific to the case I am studying, I have
made the following modifications and operationalizations. Per the pluralist model:
“active involvement” will constitute testimony at hearings, and participation in protests,
campaigns and other activities that have been covered by the news media or
acknowledged by agency officials. This is important to pluralist theory because it places
an emphasis on empirical verification of actual behavior in influencing policy outcomes
and oftentimes media coverage and agency acknowledgment are the only traces that
remain of participation. “Interest groups” are those groups of people who represent
organized, interested segments of the public who have come together voluntarily and who
occupy no position in any economic or bureaucratic hierarchy such as environmental
groups. However, the pluralist model stresses competition amongst all groups, including
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those interested organizations such as those groups o f people who do occupy positions in
the bureaucratic or economic hierarchy such as State Wildlife officials or ranchers.
Modifications to the elite model are related to the definition and
operationalization of the term “elite.” In this case elites are considered to be either
individuals stationed within the various governmental offices and agencies who exercise
power in the policy process such as federal, state and local officials and agency leaders
such as the general manager of the Las Vegas Valley Water District or individuals
stationed within the economic hierarchy who have access to the policy process. The
elite/managerial model would assume that elites whether bureaucratic or economic
should have the maintenance of their status in common.
My working definition of class-dialectic issues centers on identifying institutions
and defining class interests. The social institutions are those of capitalism as expressed
in economic imperatives that reward growth and development of human and natural
resources, democracy as expressed in the institutional mechanisms of election of
representatives through popular vote and approval of some legislation through
referendum, and government as expressed through the actions and mandates of
bureaucratic agencies and governmental bodies. Class interests are defined not by
identifying the interests of the individuals who occupy specific positions within the
economic hierarchy, but by identifying the interests of the dominant economic institution
of capitalism. However, while this model anticipates conflict to occur between dominant
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and subordinant classes (owners and workers), it is reasonable to find evidence of
conflict between segments of the dominant class (one industry clashing with another).
Although Alford and Friedland present no case studies of national, regional or
local policy processes, I will use their work to reinforce the methodological strategy laid
out by Whitt. The case study of water policy at the Las Vegas Valley Water District
invites inquiry at all levels of analysis and power. From the Cooperative Water Project
(CWP) to the construction of an additional Treatment and Transmission Facility (1 IF) to
accommodate new-found water supplies, individuals, organizations and systemic forces
all come into play.
Having established these working definitions, 1 will analyze the policy arena in
terms of who participated in the policy process over the time period, whose decisions
held sway in policy direction and who benefited from the outcomes of policy decisions.
The pluralist methodology establishes the importance of the issue to the overall political
process and maintains the focus of the research on the actors involved. By asking who
participates, who decides and who benefits under the elite/managerial model draws
attention to the interplay of individual actions and organized interests. By comparing
policy models over time, the larger issues of institutional forces become more apparent
In order to gather data for this research, I have been conducting formal and
informal interviews with Las Vegas Valley Water District staff. Southern Nevada Water
Authority (SNWA) staff and Integrated Resource Planning Advisory Committee (IRPAC)
members. I have attended the first and second phases of the IRPAC meetings from
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January 11,1995 until March 13, 1996. This attendance allowed me the opportunity to
witness the IRP model as actually implemented by the District acting in conjunction with
the SNWA I consulted technical documents and perused related secondary sources in
order to trace the policy decisions and outcomes of the District from the Cooperative
Water Project (CWP) to the development o f the IRP model. The goal of this methodology
is to parse out the layers of power at work in this public policy case. Rather than
pointing to any one layer as being the definitive source of power in a community this
study tries to create a tapestry of community power.
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CHAPTER 3

HISTORY

Water and the West
To understand Las Vegas, you must understand the West and its relationship to
water and the politics of water. In this chapter I will explore the background against
which the Las Vegas Valley Water District made its decisions. This overview will also
establish some of the historical instances of the interplay between the constraints of the
Western physical environment and the social and political policies that shaped that
environment. Water is vital to all living things and nowhere is that more painfully
apparent than in the dry and inhospitable land beyond the 100th meridian (Graf 1990;
Reisner and Bates 1990). The region receives little rainfall and possesses few rivers
compared to the verdant and humid East. So water was conceptualized legally,
politically and socially very differently by those settling the West than by their eastern
neighbors. The East has had, however, a tremendous influence on how the West was
settled, and from the seat o f the federal government numerous laws and acts attempted to
guide and encourage development.
The days of the western expansion of the United States were a heady time. The
Louisiana Purchase was followed closely by acquisition of the lands reaching to the
Pacific coast (Graf 1990; Hofstadter 1955). The United States government was in
40
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turmoil, fighting battles with foreign governments and displacing Native Americans over
control o f the lands that would become part of the new country. Debts had begim to
build up; and by the end of Civil War, the new territories were opened up to help pay off
the debt, to compensate veterans and to secure newly won areas through quick settlement
(Nelson 1995:7-14).
The western expansion was marked as much with greed as with good intentions.
Various acts such as the Homestead Act, the Desert Lands Act and the Newlands
Reclamation Act were aimed at populating the western lands with scores of independent
farmers in the Lockean-Jeffersonian tradition. The Homestead Act assumed that western
lands could be divided up into equal-sized plots and farmed successfully. This was based
on experience in the East which is characterized by heavy rainfall and abundant surface
waters. To farm in the West meant irrigation. Water had to be brought to the land. This
is a most “unnatural” way to deal with water and to grow crops (Reisner and Bates 1990).
As Marc Reisner cautioned in his book Cadillac

(1986), most societies built on

irrigation schemes in desert lands have eventually collapsed.
Settlers found that the cost of bringing water to their parched lands was well
beyond their individual and collective means. The drier the land, the higher the failure
rate. The lands in the West, however, did prove to be rich in mineral resources.
Ranchers found the wide open lands conducive to running cattle. Along with the
prosperous railroads, miners and grazers exploited loopholes in major western land
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legislation to comer water supplies for their own interests (Nelson 1995; Graf 1990;
Elliott 1987).
Law after law was offered up by Congress to remedy the abuses of land
provisions only to create greater problems and mammoth agencies dedicated to serving
vocal constituencies (Nelson 1995). The failing of the Progressive Era of the nineteenth
century Richard Hofstadter (1955) contends in his book. The Age o f Reform, was the
attempt of its leaders and proponents to fight the excess and corruption of capitalism
without fighting capitalism itself. Despite the failures. Congress kept working to develop
the West, quickly and extensively. The effects of these laws are still felt throughout the
West today.
The great rural West sent numerous powerful and legendary congressmen to
Washington. Working as a regional coalition, the West has garnered more than their fair
share of federal dollars (Nelson 1995; Elliott 1987; Cawley 1981). Nevada has sent its
share of powerful lawmakers to Washington to secure projects to further development of
its sparse lands. Francis Newland crafted the reclamation act which bears his name.
From this act flowed agencies such as the Reclamation Service and later the Bureau of
Reclamation which embarked upon a series of water projects (Reisner 1986; Elliott
1987). Many of these projects such as the Boulder Dam stand as engineering marvels
and speak to the drive to overcome the limitations of the desert and pursue economic
development (Reisner 1986).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

43
Nevada and Water
Nevada stands as an extreme example of the federal and local policies urging
development of the desert lands in the West. Although there was little agricultural
potential, Nevada still was governed by the policies emanating from Washington which
sought to create rich farm lands from parched deserts. Nevada lawmakers such as
Francis Newlands championed agricultural projects to develop the state. Despite the
great failure o f that first reclamation project near Nevada’s Pyramid Lake the effects of
the diversions o f water to that project negatively impacts wildlife to this day (Reisner and
Bates 1990:14, 61). While these agricultural ventures failed spectacularly, mining and
grazing interests manipulated various federal edicts to secure their interests (Nelson
1995; Graf 1990; Elliott 1987; Cawley 1981). Because mining and grazing interests
dominated local politics, the state adopted the legal concept of prior appropriation as the
policy for water development and use.
Prior appropriation was bom in the mining camps of California (Wilkenson
1991:1 ; Reisner and Bates 1990:62). Prior appropriation rights are rights to use and
divert water, but not rights to the water itself. Nevada, like many other western states,
holds that water is owned by the public and that any use of it most be beneficial to all
(State Water Policy 1995:3; Reisner and Bates 1990:60). This beneficial use has
historically been recognized as economic use. The traditional uses being for mining and
farming. Under state law which holds that rights to use unallocated groundwater can be
issued once it is proven before the state engineer that the water you seek is in fact there.
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that your claim for rights will not harm anyone else and that the public interest has been
served through your claim. The public interest has been measured against the principle
o f beneficial use. Instream flows and untouched ground water is considered a waste of a
precious resource here in the desert.
Unlike riparian rights which are prevalent in the East, prior appropriation allows
for water to be diverted or carried away from its source o f origin or watershed. Under
riparian rights, water rights cannot be transferred to users on land not adjacent to the
water stream or body. (Reisner and Bates 1990:62).
Some of the other important aspects of prior appropriation have to do with rules
regarding use of water. Rights to use water are recognized in a seniority of claims order.
In times of drought, senior users can use their full allotment even if there will be little or
no water left for junior rights holders. In contrast, under riparian rights structures water
shortages are shared equally by all land owners up and down stream. Because of prior
appropriation’s “first in time, first in right” principle, developers have always tried to
purchase the oldest rights possible. In Nevada, to establish rights a permitee must apply
to the state engineer, must prove that the resource sought is in fact available and must
show that the water will be put to a beneficial use. A permit can be granted, but the
rights will not be complete until the water is actually and continuously put to “beneficial
use” by the permitee (State Water Policy 1995:7-8). Historically, beneficial use has been
held to a strict economic standard which favored mining, grazing and farming uses.
Keeping water in the ground to support the flora and fauna and in stream to protect
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fisheries, was considered a waste, as water was flowing unrecoverable into the sea and
out of the thirsty desert (Reisner and Bates 1990:73). Therefore a permitee applying for
rights for water just to support natural flora and faima would be denied water. This
aspect of prior appropriation is slowly changing to reflect the economic use that water
can be put to support instream uses (Wilkenson 1991:14).
Another key to prior appropriation law is the “use it, or lose it” principle. If a
water allotment is not being put to a recognized beneficial use by the permitee, rights can
be forfeited or revoked. Thus users of water rights are encouraged to use their full
allotment every year or risk losing their right to any of it. This rule has resulted in very
inefficient use of water in the West and in Nevada (Reisner 1986; Reisner and Bates
1990). Prior appropriation and a strong federal presence continued to shape development
in Nevada in a particular way. This economic imperative in public policy calls attention
to the many levels of power at work. It was individual citizens who were using the
water; it was governmental organizations which were charged with administration of this
policy; and it was perpetuation of the dominant economic interests that this policy
served.
Besides being effected by federal policies such as the Homestead Act governing
land development in the West, Nevada has also been the beneficiary of considerable
federal largess in terms of water development projects. The Newlands Irrigation Project
in 1902 was the first program under the Newlands Reclamation Act. An attempt was
made to bring a large-scale irrigation project with federal and private money into the
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state of Nevada. The terrain both geologically and politically proved too harsh and
farming failed to keep people in the state after mining went bust in the 1890s. “In fact,
the population exodus from Nevada at that time, expressed as a percentage of those who
remained, is still the greatest in American history” (Reisner and Bates 1990:14). Despite
the failure of the Newlands Irrigation Project, the first of its type in the nation, federal
dollars continued to pour into Nevada and the West for large-scale water projects.
Land in Nevada is some of the most rugged and spare in the country. No major
rivers water its lands and some areas of the state receive less than 4 inches of rain in a
year (State Water Policy 1995). The agricultural potential of the state was slight.
Because of the traditional bias in federal water law and development of encouraging
agricultural projects, when the Colorado River was apportioned in 1922, Nevada received
a small, some claim today insignificant share of 300,000 acre feet (an acre foot equals
325,892 gallons of water or, in other words, enough water to cover an acre of land to a
foot depth) per year while California was granted 4.4 million acre feet and Arizona 2.9
million.
The Colorado River is divided up into two management basins called the Upper
and Lower basins. Nevada is part of the lower basin states along the Colorado River.
The other two lower basin states are California and Arizona. Upper basin states include
the sparsely populated states of New Mexico, Wyoming, Utah and Colorado. The growth
in population has been more dramatic in the lower basin states than in those of the upper
basin, such as Wyoming. The upper basin states are allotted a total of 7.5 million acre-
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feet per year of Colorado River water, and currently only use between 3 and 4 million
(Pappa 1990c: IA). Lower basin states have been looking jealously toward the allotments
o f those upper basin states which flow down the river as “surpluses.”
No one save for the Mormons and the railroad had taken much notice of the Las
Vegas area until the turn of the century. In the north and central parts of the state, mining
was in decline and the range was deteriorating due to overgrazing. The two cities which
were poised for growth and economic stability were Reno in the north and Las Vegas in
the south. Both had established themselves as important transportation points and
developed industries such as gambling and matrimonial services that were immune to the
boom and bust cycles of mining (Elliott 1987). In 1908, the contentious Silver State
managed to have its demands for Colorado River water written into the Republican
National Platform (Jones and Cahlan 1975:37). By the early teens. Las Vegas was
actively promoting itself as a prime area for speculation in land. Motorists stopping
through Las Vegas on their way to the 1915 exposition in San Diego were handed
postcards depicting the many wells in the area gushing forth to convey the almost
limitless supply of underground water available to this desert paradise (Jones and Cahlan
1975:52).
Along with seemingly endless groundwater supplies, the Las Vegas Valley was
also the beneficiary a large-scale project to develop Colorado River water through the
building of a dam southeast of Las Vegas across the Black Canyon in the 1930s. The
Boulder Dam project (later renamed Hoover Dam) not only speaks to the political clout
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of lawmakers from Nevada, but also to the commitment to develop water resources for
the West. This dam is truly one of the engineering marvels o f the world. More than 2
trillion gallons of water are impounded behind its cement arc {Discovery 1996:22). The
dam provided the Southern Nevada region with a $750,000 a month payroll during the
darkest days of the Great Depression (Elliott 1987:275-7).
Nevada’s political culture has shown a mix of populist and conservative factions.
The state was the home to a budding socialist party, managing to elect officials to local
office around the turn of the century (Elliott 1987). The region was also important in the
populist campaign of William Jennings Bryant (Elliott 1987; Hofstadter 1955).
Whatever the political ideology, Nevada consistently sent representatives to Washington
who secured federal dollars to support continued development. Many o f Nevada’s
legislators towed a conservative fiscal line and preached the virtues of the free market
while reaching into the deep pockets of the federal treasury. For example, the powerful
senator from Nevada Pat McCarran was one of the few democratic senators to vote
against many of president Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal proposals. McCarran,
however, did ensure that Nevada received the largest per capita share of aid during the
Great Depression (Elliott 1987:297).
According to the Naomi Duerr of the State Water Office, by the 1940s the Las
Vegas Valley had already dangerously overdrafted its groundwater supplies leading to
subsidence and disturbances to the water table levels. This would have reined in the
growth of the area had it not been for the recent completion of the Hoover Dam project in
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the Black Canyon area near Boulder City. While this project was driven mostly by the
needs of the southern California area for water and hydroelectric power and to provide an
employment project during the depression. Las Vegas was able to benefit tremendously
by the creation of the Lake Mead reservoir. Las Vegas was gradually weaned from its
dependence on groimdwater to greater reliance upon surface waters from the state’s
allotment of Colorado River water.
Federal assistance to develop water resources in Southern Nevada did not stop
with the construction of the dam. In 1967 Congress funded the construction of a
transmission and treatment plant to service the Southern Nevada area. This plant, the
Alfred Merritt Smith Water Treatment Facility “supplies 85 percent of the municipal and
industrial water to Clark County” (Water-Wise 1994:4) This plant has an aimual capacity
equal to the entire state’s Colorado River allotment It is through this facility, commonly
referred to by Las Vegas Valley District staff as our “straw” in Lake Mead, that the Las
Vegas Valley Water District and other county purveyors draw out their share of
Nevada’s Colorado River water for Southern Nevada.
Colorado River water is not simply water. Through the Colorado flows wet
water, surplus water, consumptive water, return flow credit water and a host of other
arcane terms to capture the legal and political importance of water to the West. As
Reisner and Bates (1990) contend, “[a]n obscure and complex corpus o f law has grown
up around water, with certain tenets an easterner might find bizarre. Steal your
neighbor’s water for a few years and get away with it, and the water is yours. Leave your
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water in a stream (even if your intended use demands that it remain there), and you may
lose it. Take it out, for nearly any purpose, and it is almost always “beneficial” use.
And, of course, the ultimate law of western water is that it always flows uphill - toward
money” (5). Consumptive water is that water that is apportioned to upper and lower
basin states to use without returning to the river. Return flow credits allow basin states to
use more than their allotment of water because they treat and return the water to the
river. Allotments or allocations of river water were based on the assumptions behind the
consumptive practice of agriculture.
The 300,000 acre foot allotment o f Colorado River water was expected to serve
Nevada’s needs into the next century. However, the phenomenal growth o f the late
eighties in the Southern Nevada region changed the water demand projections
dramatically. In 1989, the Las Vegas Valley Water District responded in traditional
fashion to the need for more water; it went out and applied for more. Colorado River
water was governed by the 1922 compact and the Colorado River Commission and
applications for additional water would have to go through a long and uncertain process
involving the federal government, the District fell back upon state water and state laws
governing use o f ground and surface waters by filing applications for use rights with the
state engineer’s office. By 1995, the District had shifted to a new policy model, IRP,
which emphasized weighing alternatives, demand management and involving the public
in overall water policy.
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Historical evidence suggests that use and allotment o f water supplies in the West
indicates a strong bias toward economic growth. Whether this bias in policy came about
because of pluralist competition, bureaucratic and/or economic class domination or as
the result of institutional biases which favor economic interests is impossible to tell from
this cursory review of policy decisions. However, it is clear by asking who wins, who
rules and who benefits that economic imperatives heavily influenced water policy in the
West.
The next chapter will examine the making o f water policy in the Las Vegas
Valley after 1989. I will test each major policy decision of the Las Vegas Valley Water
District against the pluralist, elite/managerial and class-dialectic models. While
examining the issues brought to the surface by each model, I will also look for gaps in the
models themselves which speak to their analytic limitations.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

NOTES

Cawley, Robert McGreggor. 1981. The Sagebrush Rebellion. Ann Arbor, MliUniversity
Microfilms International.
Discover. 1996. “Speeding Up Earth.” 17(April);22.
Elliott, Russell R. 1987. History o f Nevada. Lincoln and LondoniUniversity of
Nebraska Press.
Graf, William L. 1990. Wilderness Preservation and the Sagebrush Rebellions. Lanham,
MDrRowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Hofstadter, Richard. 1955. The Age o f Reform. New YorkiVintage Books.
Jones, Florence Lee and Cahlan, John. 1975. Water: A History o f Las Vegas. Las
Vegas, NViLas Vegas Valley Water District, volume 1.
Nelson, Robert H. 1995. Public Lands and Private Rights: The Failure o f Scientific
Management. Lanham, MDiRowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Pappa, Erik. 1990c. “Laws of the River all wet in ‘90.” Las Vegas Sun. December
24;1A,4A-5A.
Reisner, Marc. 1986. Cadillac Desert. New York:Peguin Books.
Reisner, Marc and Bates, Sarah. 1990. Overtapped Oasis: Reform or Revolution for
Western Water. Washington, DC:Island Press.
State Draft Water Policy, First Draft; Guiding Principles, Policies and Issues. 1995.
Nevada; State of Nevada.
Wilkerson, Charles F. 1991. “West’s Grand Old Water Doctrine Dies.” High Country
News. 23(August);l, 11-14.

52

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

In this chapter I will analyze the Las Vegas Valley Water District’s (the District)
water policies during the period of 1989 to 1996. I will show that a dynamic mix of
groups and interests were involved in shaping policy as might be expected from a
pluralist explanation, but upon closer inspection all three levels of power and analysis
you see that the class-dialectic model will more fully explain that the interests of
continued economic and population growth guided policy.
The year 1989 is an important date for beginning the study of water policy in
Southern Nevada. Phenomenal growth had lead to reassessments o f policy. From 1987
to 1988, the District experienced an 11 percent increase in demand. From 1988 to 1989,
that increase jumped to 13 percent (staff interviews). At this point population projections
were reassessed for the Las Vegas valley area pointing towards shortages in the near
future. The District reacted quickly and decisively from its perspective to avoid
shortages for the region. From 1989 to 1995, the District made a series of decisions
regarding water policy.
First, in October of 1989, the District applied for unallocated ground and surface
water in outlying rural counties of Nevada. The District named this project the
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Cooperative Water Project (CWP). Second, in 1991, the District took a leadership role in
the creation of a regional water authority. The Southern Nevada Water Authority
(SNWA) was established under Nevada Revised Statute 277. The water purveyors
(agencies providing water delivery or treatment) comprising the regional authority are:
the Las Vegas Valley Water District, the City of Las Vegas, the City of North Las Vegas,
the City of Henderson, Boulder City, the Big Bend Water District (serving Laughlin) and
the Clark County Sanitation District. Third, in 1994, working in conjunction with the
SNWA, the District inaugurated the use of a new planning model. This planning model
is known as Integrated Resource Planning (IRP). The IRP model emphasizes early public
involvement in policy development. An Integrated Resources Planning Advisory
Committee (IRPAC) was formed on June 16, 1994 to formulate and present
recommendations to the SNWA board. In Jime of 1995, the major recommendation of
IRPAC was the decision to build new infrastructure for the region. This infrastructure is
an additional Treatment and Transmission Facility ( i I F) at Lake Mead. (All of these
projects are summarized in appendix I.)
I will examine each of these events in the policy history of the Southern Nevada
region to see which of the theories (pliualist, elitist or class-dialectic) explains the
dynamics of these decisions. How would each theoretical perspective treat these policy
developments? Who initiated policy decisions? Whose ideas held sway? Who benefited
from those policies? Do the mix of players change from 1989 to 1996? Do historical
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trends expose contradictions in institutional demands? How did the physical
environment shape policy?

THE COOPERATIVE WATER PROJECT

The Pluralist Model
While the decision to apply for imallocated ground and surface water rights in the
counties of Clark, Nye, White Pine and Lincoln was bora in the halls of bureaucracy, the
response to this plan was something out of a civics book. Looking over the three
perspectives in general, this case study appears to have all the elements essential to the
position o f pluralists: a number of competing groups with divergent interests shaping
policy without any one group having excessive control of the process. Interested groups
of citizens were able to access government on all levels. There was active and vigorous
competition on the part of elected officials representing a wide variety of interests. By
1991, according to interviews with District staff, the Cooperative Water Project (CWP)
had been put on hold and some applications had been withdrawn. All seeming to prove
the pluralist contention that neither the economic power of a few individuals nor
bureaucratic fiat determined political outcomes because the democratic mechanisms
allowed for open and equal-footed competition of all interests and groups.
When the District announced its plan to file for unallocated ground and surface
water in Clark County as well as in three outlying rural counties of Nye, Lincoln and
White Pine, a number of divergent, competing interest groups and elected officials
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entered the political process. The progress of those interest groups and officials was
charted in Las Vegas by the two local newspapers, the Las Vegas Review Journal and the
Las Vegas Sun. Media coverage ran from skeptical reports in the Las Vegas Review
Journal to scathing exposés in the Las Vegas Sun. Eric Pappa (I990a-f) reported in the
first of a series of articles on the District’s plan entitled “Water Wars,” that rural officials
and residents had renamed the Cooperative Water Project, the “Water Grab” and recalled
past battles for rural water. “‘Remember Owens Valley’ is a common battle cry among
Nevada’s rural interests and is reflected in the form of T-shirts, hats and rhetoric,”
reported Pappa.(1990a:5E).
Articles from 1989 to 1990 indicate that first officials from the effected rural
counties voiced their concerns. Then those activists and governmental officials working
for resource and environmental protection agencies worried about the effects of the
District’s plan on wildlife spoke up. As the process went on, critics began to express
their concerns about the uncertain cost projections associated with the CWP on behalf of
the ratepayers. What follows are examples of the types of protests and concerns raised
about the CWP and evidence of the players involved in the policy dispute.
Two days after the District submitted its applications with the State Engineer, the
Las Vegas Review Journal reported the responses of county officials from two of the
effected counties. White Pine County District Attorney Dan Papez was quoted as saying,
“we’re going to do everything within our means to protect our water rights” (McKinnon
1989: IB). Rural officials worried that continued growth in Clark County would come at
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the expense of less populated areas. Nye County Manager Frank Hersman stated, “We
are trying to develop an economy here,. . . It’s going to be pretty hard to do without
water” (McKinnon 1989:8B).
A little over two months after the applications had been filed, the State
Engineer’s office was describing the public outcry against the District’s plan. “I’ve got a
stack of letters on my desk,” said [Peter] Morros, the state water engineer. “It’s the most
I’ve received since the Air Force wanted to include Nevada as an MX missile site” (Kerr
1989d;4C). The Las Vegas Review-Joumal article goes on to note that “[tjhe letters are
from people outraged at Clark County’s plan to double its water supply by building a
$1.5 billion system to transport water from Lincoln, White Pine and Nye coimties” (Kerr
1989d;4C).
Rural county wildlife officials and environmentalists brought attention to the
fragile relationship between water and the health of desert lands and the animals who
depend upon it. Sean Whaley reporting out of Carson City for the Las Vegas Review
Journal, cited numerous protests filed against the District’s applications by the State
Department of Wildlife and by wildlife commissioner and White Pine County District
Attorney Dan Papez. “Papez points to the Owens Valley in California as an example of
what can happen to wildlife when ground and surface water is diverted.. . . Wildlife
there has suffered tremendously as a result” (Whaley 1990;6B). Environmentalists such
as Chris Brown of the activist group Citizen Alert were quoted regarding the District’s
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plan, “You could create an environmental catastrophe area where springs and wetlands
dry up and turn into dust bowls” (Pappa 1990b: IE).
Rural officials and environmentalists called attention to the lack of commitment
on the part of the District to promote conservation practices. Las Vegas residents use
about ICO gallons more per day per capita than in other western cities. A 1985 US
Geological Survey report “stated in 1985 that Nevada ranked highest nationally in per
capita water consumption, at 325 gallons per person per day” (Weler 1989c: IB).
According to Terry Katzer, director of conservation research for the District, in 1988, “an
estimated 68,250 acre-feet [of water] simply ran away —into the street, drains or
surrounding property” (Weler 1989c: IB). While the District was filing for additional
water rights in the rural counties, the local papers were filled with articles about the
battle to build Lake Las Vegas, a huge master-plan community centered around a large
artificial lake. This “lake” reportedly will use “3,000 acre-feet [of water] a year —I
percent of the annual allocation from the Colorado River” (Pappa 1990e:6A). Rural
officials complained that Clark County needed to examine its “lavish use of water”
before going after additional supplies from the rural areas (Kerr 1989b:4A).
The National Park Service filed a formal protests with the state engineer claiming
that the District’s plan would endanger water source for Death Valley and Ash Meadows,
both habitats for endangered fish (Pappa I990b:5E). The US Fish and Wildlife Service
asserted that the District’s plan “could constitute violations of the Endangered Species
Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act” (Pappa l990b:5E). Enviroiunentalists and
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wildlife officials were in favor of preserving water supplies for native flora and fauna.
Activists and officials quoted on the issue were concerned about development and its
potential negative impacts on already endangered desert ecosystems. The Department of
Wildlife protested the District’s Cooperative Water Project because of concerns that
groundwater pumping would endanger two rare fish, the Pahranagat Valley roundtail
chub and the Railroad Valley tui chub, whose habitats are in Lincoln and Nye counties
(Whaley I990:6B). Chris Brown of Citizen Alert expressed concerns about the impact of
the CWP upon wetlands and springs in effected counties (Pappa 1990b:IE). The
potential environmental impacts from construction of the project and from diversion of
ground and surface waters on a large scale are serious. According to the State Water
Office, Nevada is fifth in the nation for endangered animals and first for numbers of
endangered fish.
The critics speaking on behalf of the interests o f ratepayers of the Southern
Nevada area were uneasy about committing to a water development project whose costs
were estimated to be anywhere from 1.5 to 16 billion dollars (Pappa 1990f:IA) and
whose returns in the form of substantially increased water supplies, were uncertain. The
very decision to consider applying for rural water was costly. “Ratepayers are picking up
the tab for the project before it is even bom. Water district officials say they have spent
some SI.6 million so far, although [Steve] Bradhurst [Nye County consultant] said the
figure is more likely closer to S3 million” (Pappa 1990f:4A). Critics balked at the idea
of paying for water that might not be there or that might be tied up in legal and
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environmental battles for years to come. Critics charged that “ratepayers could see their
water bills quadruple or worse” (Pappa 1990f: IA). Researchers, consultants, activists
and Southern Nevada officials were all on record in a Las Vegas Sun article as saying
that the Cooperative Water Project would not be inexpensive. “A Nye County consultant
opposed to the endeavor figures total costs could run as high as $16 billion” (Pappa
1990f; IA). Independent researchers from Clark University (Massachusetts) estimated
“total facility costs would likely range from between $2.6 billion and $7.5 billion”
(Pappa l990f:4A). No matter which figure was correct, ‘“ It’s still going to be a pretty
big chunk of change out of the ratepayers pockets,’ observed Chris Brown, Southem
Nevada coordinator of Citizen Alert” (Pappa l990f;IA).
By 1991, the Las Vegas Valley Water District was exploring other policy options
and the Cooperative Water Project was put on hold. According to a pluralist
interpretation, it would appear that these combined forces o f rural officials and residents,
environmental activists, federal resource and wildlife agencies and critics voicing
concern for the ratepayers o f the Las Vegas Valley lead the District to defer
implementation of its proposal and seek out the other alternatives that it had previously
claimed did not exist.
The outcome, as the pluralist perspective would expect, should result from a
vigorous competitive relationship between the groups involved. The pluralist model
expects to find non-hierarchically arranged groups presenting their cases and competing
for public acceptance. Each group fights in the marketplace of ideas to have its interests
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win the day. However, in the case of the Cooperative Water Project, the groups involved
in this issue were not on an equal-footing with one another. The District is the largest
water purveyor in the state. District staff have access to technical information that is
beyond the reach of most citizen interest groups due to the expense and expertise needed
to acquire such information. The rural officials have access to government funds and to
legal expertise typically out of reach to citizen interest groups. Rural ranchers,
agriculturalists and developers have close ties to the local governments in the rural
counties. The federal government has technical, legal and monetary resources beyond
the reach of the state, county or local governments involved in water policy; however, the
federal government has only limited options in impacting state water policy involving
state owned and controlled water supplies. Environmental groups such as Citizen Alert
have amassed some monetary, legal and technological resources as a citizen’s interest
group. Also, they have gained credibility in the media as witnessed by the numerous
quotations taken from Citizen Alert Southem Nevada director Chris Brown. However,
their access to the policy process is limited, in the case of the CWP, to reacting to policy
formulated by the District and it is unclear if the alliances they form reflect the pluralist
ideal o f vigorous competition among interests. The coalition of rural and environmental
groups as reported by Erik Pappa (1990 a-f) in his series of articles for the Las Vegas Sun
on the CWP was not a true alliance on the issues, but rather a legal maneuver. Rural
communities embraced environmental regulations because those regulations and the
power of the federal government could check and supersede that of the District. Seeking
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federal assistance was a way of dealing with the inequities between the competing
interest groups. Lastly, the pluralist model does not speak to all the interests o f those
segments of the public who do not have access to the resources needed impact the policy
process or do not have the recognition of the media reporting the outcome.
Because the pluralist model focuses on specific instances o f conflict and the
impact of interest group pressure on public policy outcomes, the model glosses over the
similarities between the groups. The rural officials and residents were in favor of
economic growth which would depend upon use of ground and surface water resources
as is witnessed by the numerous quotes from rural county officials expressing concern for
their own long-term development prospects tied to the availability of water resources.
The rural groups had more in common with the District on issues o f economic uses of
water resources than the pluralist model accommodates. The central and eastern coimties
projected that they will benefit from the continued economic prosperity of its neighbor to
the south. As Clark County became increasingly populated, the rural counties would
become the getaway communities for those seeking a simpler, quieter life (Pappa
1990c:8A). What the rural communities objected to was the seizure of water rights to
which they felt entitled.
However, even if the District develops the ground and surface water, the rural
counties can then use some of that water for their own development. The rural counties
will benefit from increased employment opportunities related to the project and the rural
counties can count on some form of compensation for resource use within their
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boundaries (Kerr 1989a;2B). The real sticking point between the rural counties and the
District may be the price of water rather than the water importation project itself The
threat to stop the District’s plan, may have been a tactic by the rural counties to ensure
that they receive benefits from the plan that they might not be able to afford on their own.
Because the pluralist model takes all conflict as a sign of competition of a variety
of interests, this model overlooks not only organizational biases, but systemic biases as
well. The more significant divergence of interests lies not between the coalition of rural
groups, rural officials and environmentalists on one side and the Las Vegas Valley Water
District on the other, but between the almost exclusive use of water supplies for
economic growth on one hand for urban and rural economic and population growth and
the preservation of the non-human lifeforms who must also depend on scarce water
supplies on the other. Since the pluralist model does not address larger issues of
economic and political institutions, it may over-emphasize the importance of the
participation of minority interest groups such as environmentalists. A group like Citizens
Alert, while not insignificant, would not have had the power to stop the CWP on its own.
The environmental activists and regulations may have been pawns in the dispute between
the rural and urban officials over who uses rural water for economic and population
development.
The pluralist model does draw out the individuals and groups who impacted this
policy decision. It does not, however, go beyond those people and interests who had
gained access to the policy process. In this respect, the pluralist model ignores larger
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trends and the historical context in which the policy outcomes take place. Since this
model assumes that the participants in the interest group competition were the only
interested parties to this issue, this model also ignores those individuals and alternative
interests that did not gain access to either the press or the policy bureaucracy.

Elite/Managerial Model
Taking another look at the outcome of the Cooperative Water Project, what light
does the elite/managerial shed on this policy? While the decision to defer
implementation of the CWP seemingly argues for the pluralist perspective, a closer look
at the actions of the Las Vegas Valley Water District speaks to bureaucratic reasons for
delay of the CWP. The District services the one o f the fastest growing areas in the
country. The area is also the economic powerhouse of the state bringing in the bulk of
tax revenues. The sleepy little railroad watering hole that almost no one wanted to claim
150 years ago is now internationally known as the entertainment capital of the world. In
1989, the only thing standing in the way of continued population growth and economic
prosperity was water. So the District decided to fulfill its public trust by going out and
looking for more water by pursuing the CWP. Why did the District change its policy?
According to interviews with District staff, the CWP simply did not appear to have the
water originally thought by the District. From the District's perspective, the CWP was
pushed back because of technological and economic concerns. Is this outcome, despite
the sound and fury in the media, actually the outcome of the actions of bureaucratic and
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economic elites who represent a cohesive, self-conscious class that invariably has its way
in governance?
The CWP policy offers an interesting opportunity to look for signs of elite class
consciousness or bureaucratic control. The hypotheses generated by the elite/managerial
perspective attempt to expose elite cohesion and dominance whether that domination
comes at the hands of an economic elite or at the behest of bureaucratic managers. The
model assumes that elite organizations, whether in the form of organized business
interests or bureaucracies on the federal, state or local level, are cohesive because of the
shared interest in maintaining dominance over policy and due to the many overlaps of
individuals from the elite segments of business and government. Unlike the pluralist
model, the elite/managerial model expects that no significant public participation will
occur in the policy process.
Regarding the expectation of elite/bureaucratic involvement in public policy, the
District’s decision to apply for claims on unallocated ground and surface water rights in
rural Nevada counties was exclusively the result o f bureaucratic involvement. In October
of 1989, the District initiated the CWP after review o f the latest demographic
information showing that the District might nm out o f water as early as 1995 (McKiimon
1989; IB). No public involvement was incorporated into the formation of this policy.
The District was acting in a traditional supply-oriented manner, meaning that the District
chose only to manage supply by proposing a large-scale importation project rather than
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manage demand for water. Jon Christensen reporting in High Country News
characterized the CWP as “a bold blast from the past” (Christensen 1994:12).
Since the action was legal under state law and required no legislative approval,
the District did not seek out any alliances with other elite groups. The economic elites
did not have a direct role in the formation of the CWP, but rather an indirect one. The
resort and construction/real estate industries were experiencing tremendous growth rates
and stood to continue their growth if additional water supplies could be secured by the
District. While economic elites were not directly involved in the initiation of the CWP
project, the District was acting to manage water supplies to maintain economic growth
for the good of the community.
However, the elite/managerial expectation of bureaucratic solidarity did not hold
up across bureaucracies on the local, state and federal levels; nor did all elite members of
all the economic segments in the Southern Nevada region agree to the CWP. Due to
legal agreements and historic treatment of water in the West, the District was acting in
competition rather than bureaucratic synchronization with local and regional agencies
and bureaucracies. Pat Pine the general manager of the District until April of 1989,
summed up the bureaucratic mentality of the Southern Nevada region, “the ‘use-it-orlose-it’ philosophy led to a per-capita water use o f 389 gallons a day in the Las Vegas
Valley and Boulder city [in 1988].” Pine said further, “Use-it-or-lose-it deters all o f [the
regional purveyors] from being the first ones to deter demand” (Weler 1989d:IB).
Competition among state, county and federal bodies for scarce water supplies was the
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norm for the region. Federal bureaucracies from the National Park Service to the US
Fish and Wildlife Service filed formal protests to block the implementation o f a number
of the proposed rural applications because the District’s CWP would conflict with federal
priorities to protect fish and wildlife.
Economic elites as well, were not unified. The vigorous opposition launched by
the economic elites in the rural central and eastern counties showed a lack of unity across
regions of the state. Diversion o f rural county ground and surface water would inhibit
economic development of rural lands. The economic elites of the Southern Nevada area
appeared relatively silent on the CWP issue. The media coverage in the Southern
Nevada area focused on the high and uncertain cost projections for the CWP and the
rural and environmental impacts of the project. While the resort and construction/real
estate industries need more water to continue to grow, they needed to keep their costs
down in order to remain competitive with neighboring metropolitan areas, such as Los
Angeles or Phoenix.
The issue o f unified elite domination of policy is also problematic given the
evidence of this case study. While the District possessed a wealth of information and
technical expertise on this issue, competing parties with non-elite positions were able to
challenge the District’s plan in the media Environmentalists such as Chris Brown from
Citizen Alert, researchers such as Mike Baughman and Rachel Finson of Clark University
(Massachusetts), and critics such as Don Springmeyer who favored greater public
oversight in District rate policy were all quoted as having informed opinions on the issue
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of the CWP (Pappa 1990d;9A). The District is a public agency and is accountable for its
actions to the Clark County Commission. Such negative media coverage can be a
reflection of voter dissatisfaction with public policy. While there is no direct evidence
that public dissatisfaction led to the District’s decision to defer the CWP, there is also
little evidence that the District held an unchallenged monopoly on water policy in the Las
Vegas Valley.
The elite/managerial expectation of political stability does not hold in this
policy outcome. The stability of political allegiances that elite and managerial theorists
expect to find was not apparent in the political outcome of the CWP. Economic elites
and bureaucrats in the rural areas joined forces with environmentalist groups such as
Citizen Alert. Those same rural elites who have routinely fought environmental
regulation and who have incited numerous Sagebrush Rebellions against the legislative
and regulatory power of the federal government were not above using the fine print in
environmental laws such as NEPA and the punch of federal oversight to block the
District in its attempt to claim rights to rural ground and surface waters (Pappa
1990b:5E).
Lastly, the elite/managerial hypothesis that outcomes consistently favor dominant
economic and bureaucratic elite interests, does not hold up in the examination of the
outcome o f the CWP proposal. Despite the fact that the Southern Nevada area brings in
the lion’s share of revenues into the state and required additional water supplies to
continue performing well economically and despite the fact that the District is the largest
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water purveyor in the state, managing nearly 80% of the state’s Colorado River allotment
(Water-Wise 1995:2), the CWP simply did not pass into being without a ripple of
disturbance. Other interests, elite and non-elite alike, assembled to oppose the District’s
plan. The argument that the economic and bureaucratic elites in Las Vegas and Clark
County are a cohesive, self-conscious class that invariably get its way is not supported by
the events surrounding the outcome of the CWP to date.
Despite the dominance o f economic and bureaucratic elite interests involved in
the CWP, the outcome was not entirely the result of behaviors and decisions on the part
of a group of economic or bureaucratic individuals. This model does, however make
clear that a handful o f people have access to the agencies shaping policy or credibility in
the eyes o f the media. This model does illuminate the individuals who are most active
and respected in the policy process without showing that those powerful individuals
invariably get their way. This model also ignores the power that minority views have
attained in the policy process through their access to media outlets or through the
democratic institutions of voting. When the Cooperative Water Project policy is
considered in isolation from institutional and historical contexts, it appears that the
elite/managerial model does not indicate elite or bureaucratic monopoly over public
policy.

Class-Dialectic Model
Turning to the class-dialectic model, what how do institutions leave their traces in
public policy? Where the pluralist model concentrates on the individual agent and the
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elite/managerial on organizational power, the class-dialectic model exposes the systemic
level of power in order to explain biases that occur in policy over time despite the actions
o f individuals and groups as well as the contradictions in those systemic forces that allow
for change to arise out o f conflict. The Cooperative Water Project offers an opportunity
to see if institutional imperatives explain more about the policy outcome than the
imperatives of rational, politically motivated individuals or bureaucratic and/or economic
elites seeking to consolidate their position. Also, the economic growth in the entire
Southern Nevada region offers a chance to see if there will be any evidence of class
conflict between the working and capital classes.
In 1990, Clark County faced the possibility of a moritorium on building permits.
This threat of a moratorium came at the height of population growth in the Las Vegas
Valley (Shetterly 1990:4B). Permits for new construction are tied to water availability.
In 1989, the Las Vegas Valley Water District staff had worked up population and supply
projections in the face of this unprecedented growth. These projections indicated that the
District might run out o f water as soon as 1995. Since the District supplies water for the
city of Las Vegas and the unincorporated areas of Clark County such as the resort
corridor popularly known as the Las Vegas Strip, the District felt that they had to act
quickly and with whatever options were immediately available.
The District had only limited options to deal with the population and economic
growth in the area. Patricia Mulroy, who became General Manager of the District shortly
before initiating the Cooperative Water Project, was quoted in an issue of High Country
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News as saying, “You can’t take a community as thriving as [the Las Vegas area] and put
a stop sign out there,. . . The train will run right over you” (Christensen 1994:13). The
District is a public utility bound by law to provide safe, clean and reliable supplies of
drinking water to its customers. The District has the authority only to raise water rates,
connection fees and little else. For example, conservation measures such as building and
plumbing codes must be passed as ordinances through the Clark County Commission.
Given that the District staff projected only a 4 to 5 year window before existing water
supplies were exhausted the District did not have time, at that point, to pursue an
aggressive conservation program. Neither, did the District have time to engage in
lengthy and uncertain negotiations with the federal bureaucracies governing the
allocation of Colorado River water. Instead, the District went after unallocated ground
and surface water in its home county of Clark and in the counties of Nye, Lincoln and
White Pine.
The way in which the rural officials and economic interests fought the District’s
plan are indicative of institutional contradictions coming to the fore. The economic and
legal concept of prior appropriation had forged policies regarding water use in the West
that encouraged economic exploitation of water resources. Policies dictated that water
must be brought to arid areas in order to reclaim the desert from its dusty waste and put
that land to economic use. Laws such as the Desert Lands Act and the Newlands
Reclamation Act are examples of policy which actively promoted economic development
of Western lands. Over a hundred years later, through the institution of democratic
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government, citizens and activists swept a series o f environmental protection laws onto
the books during the 1960s and 1970s. The clash over the District’s CWP plan
illuminated the fact that policies such as prior appropriation that had been instituted to
encourage economic growth in arid areas now created conflicts between traditional rural
use and latter day urban use.
The consequences of these two institutional trends of promoting economic
exploitation of natural resources and o f protecting natural resources through the policies
of an open democratic government can be seen in the tactics used by the rural officials
and rural economic interests. All claims for water rights have to pass through the office
of the state engineer. The three criteria that must be met before granting rights are; (1)
that the party applying show the water is in fact there; (2) that the party applying show
that no harm will come to other rights holders; and (3) that the use to which the water
will be put by the party applying for the rights will be in the public interest (State Water
Policy 1995:6-11). The public interest has meant economic use, specifically mining or
agricultural activity. However, the concept is expanding but still favors commercial use.
According to newspaper accounts, State Engineer Mike Tumipseed appeared to act in
concert with the political desires and needs of the rapidly growing southern county. The
engineer seemed willing to request only limited impact studies from the District in order
to grant the permits (Pappa 1990a:5E). This had rural officials and rural economic
interests calling into play such federal environmental laws such as National
Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in order to
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bring the state engineer and the District in compliance with federal regulations. “The
rural counties opposing the project would like to see rigorous, federal Environmental
Impact Statements (EIS) prepared for each of Clark County’s 146 well-site applications”
(Pappa 1990a:5E). The state engineer responded that “he will require some
environmental issues to be addressed before approving the water district’s application,
but said that he is ‘not necessarily concerned about all the aspects an EIS has to cover’”
(Pappa 1990a;5E).
Conflict was evident between segments o f economic elites; however, the CWP
decision did not incite any class conflict in the classic sense. The subordinate class of
workers did not rise up against the District’s plan. The District’s plan would allow for
more construction employment in the Las Vegas Valley and for further expansion of the
resort industry. It could be argued that the working class perceived that it had much to
gain by bringing additional water supplies into the region. Also, the evidence from the
CWP does not point to the formation of any organization or inner circle mechanism, such
as the Chamber of Commerce in Nancy Kleniewski’s (1982) study, to address the
implications of the policy proposal for the community and identify any possible conflicts
before going forward.
However, even though there was no evidence of class conflict, there was evidence
to support the class-dialectic expectation of finding outcomes that favor the dominant or
economic elite class, but that may at times reflect the interests of non-elites stemming
from constraints o f structural contradictions. The clash between the economic
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imperatives of continued growth and the democratic imperatives of preserving the public
environment created a crisis which allowed non-dominant views a political opening.
Although the rural county residents are committed to preserving their own economic
interests tied to use of water resources, their tactics of calling for further environmental
review and stricter conservation measures provided environmental activists with a
prominent platform from which to attack the District’s policies. One key issue for
environmentalists was that o f conservation.
Citizen Alert took advantage of the crisis brought on by the District’s proposed
water importation project to bring the issue of conservation to the fore of the valley’s
agenda when discussing meeting future water demands for the area residents. Bob
Morris, a researcher working at UNLV was quoted as criticizing the District’s
conservation policies regarding low-irrigation plants. Besides having little proof that the
plants recommended by the District policy do in fact require less water to maintain than
turf, the article added, “Perhaps more significantly, the guidelines do not apply to houses,
even though they use 49 percent of the water provided by the water district and 50 to 70
percent of that is used outdoors” (Pappa 1990e;lA).
The largest use of urban water in the Las Vegas area is for residential purposes.
And of that residential use, 64 percent goes toward irrigating ornamental lawns. Las
Vegas consistently use more water than per capita than its neighboring metropolitan
areas as was shown in the US Geological Survey report on per capita water usage in the
state (Weler 1989c: IB). In the winter, the average Las Vegas area household uses 450
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gallons per day and in the summer, that average daily household use reaches 895 gallons
(PMCL 1992:10). Most of that increase usage from winter to summer is accounted for by
attempts on the part of residential customers to maintain large areas of turf grass under
the extreme summer temperatures and low rainfall conditions of the region.
Critics charged that the District should focus first on establishing an aggressive
conservation program before seeking out new water supplies and the new environmental
and social impacts that will follow from large-scale importation projects such as the
CWP. Tucson bucked the historic trend of increasing per-capita water use in the West.
“A decade ago, faced with projected water development costs of $145 million, the city
chose to shift its philosophy from simply meeting water demand to managing it” (Postel
1986:48). Tucson developed an aggressive mix of pricing and incentive programs to
bring “yearly average demand down by 27 percent” (Postel 1986:48). Besides realizing
savings to the environment which would have been impacted negatively by a large-scale
importation or reservoir project, “a comparatively modest investment in conservation
allowed the city to defer $45 million in capital costs that would have been needed to
meet an otherwise unmanaged demand” (Postel 1986:48).
This type of media coverage highlighted the alternative policies that might be
pursued with regard to water policy in the region. That other non-elite interests had
impact on policy outcomes in the case o f the CWP does not mean that those non-elite
interests won the day in the policy process. Growth still won. Even though the District
deferred the CWP, it did not drop this option entirely. The claims that have proven
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unfeasible economically have been dropped, but the others are still being held in
abeyance. However, dealing only with this single policy decision does not fully expose
the institutional and political contexts in which decisions are made. In order to consider
that issue, other steps in the policy history o f the District must be examined.
According to the class-dialectic perspective, dominant economic interests were
clearly involved, from both urban and rural areas. While on the institutional level,
economic and population growth was a goal, highly-valued by both urban and rural elites,
conflicts and crisis emerged with regard to the details of pursuing growth. There was
little interclass conflict in the form of the working class opposed to the actions of the
capital class.

THE SOUTHERN NEVADA WATER AUTHORITY

With considerably less media attention in November of 1989, the District took
steps to investigate policy options other than the Cooperative Water Project in order to
better deal with the impending water shortages. Up until 1989, the Southern Nevada
water purveyors or agencies charged with water delivery and/or treatment had acted
independently of one another in a highly competitive climate of securing scarce water
resources under laws and policies that encouraged water rights holders, whether as
individuals or as agencies, to apply for and use as much water as possible before that
water was claimed by someone else. While the District was in the throes o f the initial
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work on the CWP, it also initiated the Water Resources Management Incorporated
(WRMI) process. According to the report issued, “the District retained Water Resources
Management, Inc. (WRMI) o f Columbia, Maryland, a consulting firm specializing in
resolving water disputes, to recommend a methodology for developing a region-wide
solution to the Las Vegas Region’s water supply problems” (WRMI 1992:4). According
to interviews with District staff members and the WRMI report itself, the District reached
out to the other regional purveyors to join in the process. The City of Henderson, North
Las Vegas and Boulder City joined along with the Nellis Air Force Base, the Las Vegas
Valley Sanitation Department and the Big Bend Water District serving the water needs of
the rapidly growing city of Laughlin.
The most important outcome that led, according to SNWA and District staff
members, indirectly from the WRMI process was the formation of a regional authority to
oversee and coordinate water policy for Southern Nevada. The Southern Nevada Water
Authority (SNWA) was formed in June of 1991 under Nevada Revised Statute 277 to
facilitate that regional policy effort The formation of the SNWA opened up
opportunities to negotiate for the remainder of Nevada’s Colorado River water and to
coordinate programs that would track return flow credits (that amount of Colorado River
water used in excess o f the 300,000 acre-foot allotment which is not consumed, but
rather recaptured, treated and returned to the river) previously unavailable to the District
or the other individual regional purveyors in the Southern Nevada area. Also, the SNWA
discovered in the course of negotiations with the Secretary of the Interior that the
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regional authority was eligible for contracts on temporary Colorado River surpluses. In
1989, there was no SNWA and each purveyor was responsible for managing its own
supplies. The WRMI process was the first instance where all the regional purveyors
came together to study demand projections and audit supplies.
This policy decision has implications for the theoretical models which will be
discussed in detail in the following sections. However, it should be clear even at this
point that the implications o f the pluralist, elite/managerial and class-dialectic models are
different than from the previous policy decision.

Pluralist Model
The pluralist expectations of competing, divergent groups operating in a level
political forum allowing for outcomes that favor no one set of interests were not bom out
by the evidence of this policy decision. The parties involved were only those water
purveyors responsible for water delivery and/or treatment in the Southern Nevada area
who had joined together to form a regional force to address water policy. The public was
only indirectly involved in that the creation of a regional authority was only possible
under existing state law which did have to pass through the popularly elected legislature.
There was little notice taken of the formation of a regional authority on the part of the
public as the formation of the SNWA did not significantly affect the cost of water rates to
the customers of the individual purveyors.
The pluralist model would overlook how the decision to form a regional authority
might alter the political balance in public policy issues in the Las Vegas Valley. In fact.
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due to the lack of controversy and interest group activity, a pluralist researcher might
overlook this policy step entirely. Unlike the CWP, the lack of public involvement leads
to a lack of open conflict. While the formation and the workings of the SNWA are
public and do not occur in the dark of night, they are highly controlled and the
controversies and alternative policies are not a part of the finished policy. The public is
in the position of reacting to the policy created at the agency level. This is not the
expectation of the pluralist model.
The technical staff at the District working in conjunction with the WRMI staff
worked with each purveyor to establish accurate, comparable data and then devised
scenarios and conclusions based on a mix of time and conditions whereby each purveyor
might likely run out of water for additional development. According to District staff and
substantiated by media coverage of previous attempts at regional plaiming efforts, this
level o f cooperation marked a change from traditional behavior and broke down many
institutional barriers regarding water policy and planning.

Elite/Managerial Model
This outcome does, however, speak to issues central to the elitist model. The
public was excluded and the interests of other groups or classes were considered only
incidentally to the core issue of managing supplies and demands by the agencies
themselves. Technical expertise and access were paramount to the outcome as well as
the opportunity to organize and coalesce on issues related to their interests. This process
allowed the regional water purveyors to stabilize and strengthen their political
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allegiances and work toward policies that favor their interests. From the viewpoint of the
District, this policy outcome will lead to a more efficient policy for them and for their
customers as well as greater security of water supplies for continued expansion by
economic interests tied to growth industries.
The leadership role of the District in the formation of the SNWA speaks to the
increasing power that the agency wields in the region. Additional supplies stave off
“worse case scenarios” forcing the county or one of the regional cities such as North Las
Vegas or Henderson to issue moratoriums on building permits because of inadequate
water supplies (Shetterly 1990:4B). The SNWA consolidates both the bureaucratic and
economic interests regarding water policy.
Also, the model highlights the overlaps in membership on key boards and elected
bodies. Paul Christensen represents the typical elite member that the elite/managerial
model expects to find. Mr. Christensen is a Clark County Commissioner and chairman
of the board o f directors for the Las Vegas Valley Water District. With the formation of
the SNWA, Mr. Christensen brings his considerable political weight to bear as the
chairman of that board. Jay Bingham, another SNWA director, is not only a Clark
County Commissioner, but also a partner in the development group Falcon Homes (staff
interviews). According to SNWA letterhead, the other directors come from commissions
and council districts throughout the SNWA region. Bruce Woodbury is a Clark County
Commissioner, Larry Scheffler is a City of Henderson Councilman, Scott Higginson is a
City of Las Vegas Councilman, Mary Kincaid, the Vice-Chairman [sic] of the SNWA is a
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City o f North Las Vegas Councilman [sic], and Eric L. Lundgaard is a Boulder City
Councilman. The general manager of the SNWA is listed as Pat Mulroy. She is also the
general manager for the District, and the District supplies the bulk of technical staff and
expertise.
However, just looking at this particular policy decision does not illuminate the
context in which it was made. Agency solidarity had not been the rule in the Southern
Nevada region. Before the WRMI process, the water purveyors in the Southern Nevada
area had been in active competition with one another. Many attempts had been made to
rationalize regional planning in the area, but each proposal had been rebuffed. On
February 8, 1989, a Las Vegas Review Journal headline read, “Water usage sparks fear of
shortage in near future” (Weler 1989a: I A). The article claimed that District engineer
Alan Walter “said that water conservation will be essential soon if rapid growth is to
continue” (Weler 1989a:4A). However, according to media accounts, developing a
conservation plan was not that easy.
Article after article detailed the conflicts between different governmental and
agency entities over control of the areas scarce water supplies. Plans to develop
comprehensive water policy on the city, county or state level met with protest. Clark
County battled the District. All of the cities alternately fought off comprehensive plans
proffered by the District and the state (Weler 1989b: IB). Issues of local control or
economic development were raised again and again. When the state discussed reviving
the state Division of Water Planning, Clark County Lobbyist Robert Broadbent put forth
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his case against the proposal. “If the water planning division wants to develop a
statewide water budget, ‘then they are going to control the growth and development’ of
local communities and we object to it’” (Lowell I989:19A).
By April of 1989, Clark County approved a water plan that sought to control the
local cities just as the state had tried to control it. Anita Weler reporting for the Las
Vegas Review Journal said that the plan “has two major goals - reducing individual
water use by 25 percent in five years and gaining control of water resources” (Weler
1989e: IB). She continued, “A major objective of the plan is to change state water
contracts that county officials say encourage local cities and the county to use water or
lose future entitlements. The plan also reinforces county efforts to gain control of water
resources now controlled by a state agency, the Colorado River Commission” (Weler
1989e: IB). Although Clark County and the District are not the same entity they do share
the services of commissioner Paul Christensen who also serves as the Chairman of the
Board of the Las Vegas Valley Water District. Christensen has played an active role in
water policy both as a county commissioner and as a District board member.
Weler reported that Boulder City General Manager George Forbes was skeptical
of county’s plan. “Is the issue conservation or who controls water in Southern Nevada?
Is the county’s proposed legislation aimed at water conservation or power? Those are
two distinctly different subjects” (Weler 1989e;lB). The city manager of North Las
Vegas, Michael Dyal was quoted as being opposed to the county’s plan. He asserted that
the county was trying to usurp the authority of the Colorado River Commission which in
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his estimation has acted as a “neutral arbiter in negotiating water supply” (Njegomir
I989;5B). He was quoted further. “‘[The Colorado River Commission officials] have a
role to play, and we respect that role,’ he said. The county, by contrast, has a vested
interest in wresting as much water as it can for itself and would be unfit to negotiate
water supplies for other” (Njegomir 1989:5B). Small but growing cities in the Southern
Nevada region such as North Las Vegas have a vested reason to protect their contracted
water supplies. In August of 1989, it was reported in the Las Vegas Review Journal that
the value of new construction permitted in the city nearly tripled. “The city has issued
398 building permits for new construction valued at more than $37.7 million from
January through July, compared with 429 permits with a valuation of $14.5 million for
the same period” (Caruso 1989:1C).
Officials from Clark County were later reported to “deny [they made] any
attempts at grabbing water from the smaller cities, and insist they want to rework the
[Colorado River] agreements to ensure conservation measures are included” (Shetterly
1989:7B). Although all o f the regional purveyors faced shortages 5, 10 or 20 years down
the road, the District serving the unincorporated areas of Clark County, and the Las
Vegas area was due to run out of water the soonest In the final analysis, the
elite/managerial model gives little theoretical direction on the issue of why these
individual agencies decided to come together under a regional authority, the SNWA,
which is largely directed by Las Vegas Valley Water District staff and, presumably, its
policy objectives.
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The elite/managerial model does not highlight the competition that the District
and the SNWA face from other states for access to Colorado River water. California and
Arizona both have economies dependent upon economic and population growth.
According to newspaper accounts, in 1990 District general manager Pat Mulroy asked
“the federal government to lock up [Nevada’s] unused Colorado River water supply so
California can no longer lay claim to it” (Shetterly 1990: IB). Also in 1990, the Las
Vegas Review Journal reported an Associated Press item that “Arizona wants to take
more water from the Colorado River” (Associated Press 1990:93). The elite/managerial
model does not accommodate the elite and bureaucratic conflicts which may be out of
the direct control of local economic and bureaucratic elites; nor, does it factor in the
effect that the scarcity of the resource at stake may play in shaping alliances and forming
policy.
In sum, the elite/managerial model did highlight the lack of public participation
and the degree to which bureaucratic elites held overlapping positions within the policy
process. However, despite the early indications that the elite/managerial model would
prove a well-matched analytic framework for the policy decision on the part of the Las
Vegas Valley Water District to form a regional water authority with six other local water
purveyors, the model proved inadequate chiefly because it was blind to the context in
which the policy decision had been made. By focusing exclusively on the points where
bureaucratic and elite control were consolidated, the model ignored the long history of
competition among local bureaucracies. The model offers no explanation of the
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circumstances that would explain the decision on the part of the Las Vegas Valley Water
District and the six other regional purveyors to constitute the Southern Nevada Water
Authority in light o f past attempts and failures at consolidation. And lastly, the model
ignores the larger bureaucratic conflicts looming over the state borders. The model does
nothing to accommodate the pressure that competition for water supplies with two larger
more populous states within the confines of a federally administered framework might
have on the decision making process of the District and her sister agencies within
Southern Nevada.

Class-Dialectic Model
Many of the outcomes that are expected under the class-dialectic model hold up
in an examination of the decision on the part of the regional purveyors to follow the
District into the WRMI process. Due to contradictions in institutional structures, such as
the water laws which encourage competitive and commercial use of water while
discouraging cooperation and conservation of water, the conflicting goals of increasing
economic and population growth while maintaining low government infrastructure costs
and the strains of intense water consumption in the most arid metropolitan area in the
country, the regional purveyors agreed to sit down with the District and cooperate. While
no economic elites were directly involved with this decision or the objectives developed
through this process, the overall interest of continued economic and population growth
was served by this policy step.
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By focusing on the historical context and the institutional trends within a case
study, the class-dialectic model brings structural contradictions to the attention of the
researcher. For example, under the legal constraints of prior appropriation and the
beneficial use stipulation of prior appropriation, there was little historic or legal incentive
to conserve water. Prior appropriation guaranteed set allotments of water, conserving
meant throwing those certainties out the window. Each water purveyor held separate
permits to rights of Nevada ground and surface water and held separate contracts with the
Colorado River Commission, the federal agency which enforces the Colorado River
Compact allotments. Then District general manager Pat Pine commented, “the fact that
the county and cities in the Las Vegas area are ‘entitled to as much water as we pumped
last year’ makes the Colorado River contracts ‘counter-productive’” He added,
“Everyone will use it as fast as they can” (Weler I989d: IB).
The various purveyors operated within this competitive structure until the
negative effects became too pronounced. The foundations of some of the Las Vegas
Valley’s earliest wells now hover three to four feet above ground. The extensive and
uncoordinated pumping of the area’s groundwater has caused marked subsidence
throughout the Las Vegas Valley (Schmeigler 1995:128). The report filed by Planning
Management Consultants, Ltd. for the WRMI process indicated, “[t]he underground
acquifers are experiencing a net decline in the water table, thus increasing the
dependence of the region on the Colorado River” (PMCL 1992:15). While control o f the
state’s ground and surface waters was largely under local control, those resources were
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less and less important to meeting the water demands of the various local purveyors.
Federal mandates demanded that water policy regarding the remaining allotment and
surplus water of the Colorado River be handled by under a regional policy rather than an
agency-by-agency one. This evidence points to an institutional inevitability in the
consolidation of the Southern Nevada water agencies, rather than to bureaucratic
rationality.
Another instance of institutional inevitability concerns the issue of conservation.
If the District working in conjunction with the SNWA is to take full advantage of
Colorado River water, conservation measures must be regionally coordinated and
carefully developed to enhance rather than inhibit the opportunities for gaining return
flow credits. Also, developing a concerted regional conservation policy raises the
prospect that competing water agencies from upper and lower Colorado River basin
states will be more likely to accommodate the water demands of the Las Vegas Valley
(WRMI 1992:12).
Another aspect of conservation that may appears to have guided the Las Vegas
Valley Water District into bringing the other regional purveyors into a regional authority
structure is the economic issues surrounding water use in the Las Vegas Valley. Relying
on 1990 United States’ Census data and research results from the Center for Business and
Economic Research o f the University of Nevada Las Vegas, the PCML report provided a
demographic snapshot of Southern Nevada’s population, its economic base and its water
uses. The report confirmed that the population had indeed grown dramatically. “Nevada
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is the fastest growing state in the country and experienced a 5 1 percent population
increase from the 1980 Census” (PCML 1992:5). The resort industry was found to be the
foundation of the regional economy with the construction/real estate industry also
performing strongly. “Tourist volume increased 50 percent during the past decade,
resulting in the addition of 22,000 hotel/motel rooms, associated entertainment and
recreational facilities, and spillover construction and supporting commercial service
expansion. Upcoming development projects, such as master-planned communities and
hotel theme parks are expected to facilitate sustained high growth rates in employment
and population” (PCML 1992:5).
As for the region’s water profile, 55.3 percent of the water is used for residential,
non-commercial purposes, while 47.7 percent serves commercial demand (PMCL
1992:10). The average single family water customer uses around “450 gallons per
household per day in the winter and 895 gallons per household per day in the summer”
(PMCL 1992:11). The sharp seasonal peak in water usage stems from the climatic
conditions of the region coupled with a prevalence o f ornamental lawns and pools in the
region. Of water used by residential customers, over 60 percent of that water is used to
irrigate turf (Water-Wise 1994). It was imperative for the District as well as the other
purveyors who came together under the SNWA to reconsider developing comprehensive
conservation program considering the constraints of federal management of the Colorado
River, competition from other states, and the low economic value of which much of the
region’s scarce water resources was being used.
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In review, while the District serves the region of the state of Nevada experiencing
the greatest percentage of economic and population growth and that same region returns
the greatest portion of revenues to the state coffers, the District caimot make policy
decisions without regard to the political ramifications of its actions because of the
contradictory goals of the political and economic institutions within which it operates.
The SNWA did create the kind of mechanism through which conflicts could be addressed
and solidarity formed that united the regional water purveyors that the class-dialectic
model would expect to find. This mechanism did not directly include members of the
dominant economic strata as lobbyists or contributors the political forces responsible for
authorizing its formation, but the outcome did favor the overall interests o f growth in that
it was a policy designed to accommodate the most politically and economically efficient
means for securing additional water supplies for the District and the region. However,
this particular case study does not offer evidence o f class conflict as would be expected
by the class-dialectic model. The next policy step by the District may speak to this issue
of class conflict.

INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING MODEL
AND THE INTEGRATED RESOURCE
PLANNING ADVISORY
COMMITTEE

As a regional authority, the SNWA was also entitled to contract for surpluses in
the river. Along with the 58,000 acre-feet of water coming from the completion of the
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state’s Colorado River allotment, Pat Mulroy the General Manager of the Las Vegas
Valley Water District, acting through the SNWA wheeled and dealed to gain additional
water supplies. According to a High Country News article, in 1993 Mulroy brokered a
precedent-setting three-way deal for water with the Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California (representing Los Angeles and surrounding areas) and the Central
Arizona Water Conservation District (Christensen 1994:12). The added water supply
was bringing the present transmission and treatment facility ( I I P) to full operating

capacity during peak periods, such as summers. The District working in conjunction
with the SNWA began to consider ways to facilitate the new water supplies.
In 1993, District staff members attended a water resources and policy conference
held in Las Vegas, entitled Conserv93: the New Water Agenda (staff interviews).
Several presentations discussed the possibilities of adopting the Integrated Resource
Planning (IRP) model used extensively by electrical utilities for more than twenty years
(Fiske and Dong 1995). The American Water Works Association, a clearing house for
industry information and trends published a bibliography of IRP presentations and case
studies. Most of the information available through this bibliography had been presented
at the 1993 water conference held in Las Vegas and attended by District staff. Here are a
sampling of definitions of ERP models:
Over the last several years, “integrated resource planning” for water utilities has
been growing in popularity. Having its origins in the electric and natural gas
industries, integrated resource planning has been viewed ad an opportunity to
more comprehensively and responsively address water planning goals of a
community or region. This paper provides a background of integrated resource
planning and the role of pricing in addressing integrated resource planning
objectives (Raftelis 1993:abstract)
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Integrated resource planning is a way to create a comprehensive water resource
plan based on least-cost planning and analysis of augmented supply and demand
management practices. IRP take into account all the various factors, from
engineering to politics, that influence such planning. The state of Connecticut is
a leader in creating a statewide water resources management programs, reducing
the number of regulators utilities must deal with in implementing IRP. The initial
IRP should be prepared using a collaborative approach involving the public.
There are a minimum of 10 areas that should be included in an IRP, ranging from
water quality and capacity planning to budgeting. These must mesh with larger
objectives, such as using least cost analysis o f supply and demand management
practices (Albani 1993 .abstract).

The SNWA along with the assistance of the consulting firm Barakat and
Chamberline commenced the IRP process in Southern Nevada. Documents provided by
the SNWA show that the SNWA Technical Support staff was responsible for everything
from providing engineering data to coordinating public affairs. The public participation
component of the IRP was fulfilled by the Integrated Resources Planning Advisory
Committee or IRPAC. SNWA’s IRPAC was convened on June 16, 1994 in order to
become educated as to the options and trade-offs available to the region. This citizens
advisory committee consisted of 21 members, three chosen by each of the seven
members of the SNWA At a public SNWA board meeting, IRPAC presented a package
of recommendations to the SNWA for ratification in June of 1995. The package
included a number of policy goals which ordered water management policy for the
District and the region
The major recommendation of the IRPAC board to the SNWA was the
recommendation to build in phases an additional Treatment and Transmission Facility
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(TTF). The TTF is also known as the “second straw” in Lake Mead. It is through the
present TTF that the region accesses its Colorado River allotment. This additional
facility was deemed necessary by the IRPAC board in order to achieve two goals for
regional water policy: (1) to provide for a backup facility to match the present TTF and
guard against catastrophic loss of service in case of natural or human-caused disruption.
The new TTF would increase capacity by nearly double the present water treatment and
transmission capacity by the final phase estimates provided by the District staff through
the IRPAC educational process.
This next decision in the Las Vegas Valley Water District’s policy history shows
that while the District had taken the initiative to develop a policy and influence its
outcome, that the planning model chosen may reflect the importance of pluralist issues of
the vitality of democratic institutions within the policy arena or class-dialectic concerns
about the contradictory goals of our major social institutions.

Pluralist Model
The outcome of choosing an IRP planning model did not come directly as a result
o f the kind of open competition of various interests groups that the pluralist model would
expect. The decision to proceed with an IRP planning model was taken by staff members
working for the District in conjunction with the regional SNWA. However, pluralists
would argue that the choice of a planning model that emphasizes public participation
reflects the influence and the power available in the general public.
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What separates the ERP model from multi-variant analysis developed to deal with
the growing complexity of water supply issues is the emphasis on public participation.
“The importance of public information and involvement cannot be overemphasized.
Their value will be directly related to the manner in which resource alternatives are being
evaluated” (Fiske and Dong 1995:75). By 1994, the SNWA adopted the ERP model in
order to proceed with the many issues facing the region. An independent consulting firm
was contracted to guide the implementation of the ERP process and to help assemble a
citizens advisory board that would be representative o f the community interests.
The mode of public participation chosen by the SNWA was the IRPAC Citizen’s
Advisory Committee. IRPAC is made up of 21 members nominated by the sevenmember SNWA board. Each SNWA member chose 3 people to sit on the IRPAC board.
Names were generated by the SNWA members themselves and by IRP public relations
division. In an interview with Judie Brailsford discussed that the SNWA had decided to
convene a citizen’s committee that would provide input over a long planning period.
SNWA asked potential IRPAC members to commit to at least one year’s service. She
indicated that due to the long term commitment to an educational process that was
required, IRPAC members were chosen based on (1) their past history of activism or
public participation, and (2) on the degree to which they represented both regionally
dispersed interests and the interests of prominent stakeholders (large water users from the
resorts to the school district). Choosing ERPAC members by random sampling
techniques had been considered but the resulting group would have probably had the
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characteristics o f a focus group. Greater depth of interest and commitment were deemed
more important qualities for the IRP process as envisioned by the SNWA Technical
Support Staff (see appendix 2 for listing of IRPAC members).
Pluralists would point to the composition of IRPAC as further proof that the
policy process reflected the competitive political climate that pluralist expect to find.
According to SNWA staff members, the composition of the IRPAC Board represented a
cross-section of political interests and development interests. The larger community and
the environment were represented through the appointment of two members, Chris
Brown and Jeff Van Ee, who have extensive environmental and community organizing
backgrounds Chris Brown had formerly been the Southern Nevada coordinator of the
peace and environmental activist group Citizen Alert. Currently, he heads the activist
group Campaign for Nevada’s Future. Jeff Van Ee is a local board member of the Sierra
Club. He is also embroiled in a whistle-blowing case involving his employer the
Environmental Protection Agency.
Observations of IRPAC meetings confirmed that while most of the dissent had
been voiced by the two IRPAC board members with ties to the environmental movement,
even those representing capital interests raised concerns and issues which touched upon
conservation measures and ratepayers concerns. The lack of consensus on these issues
contributed to the extension of discussion on conservation and financing issues into a
second phase o f IRPAC meetings.
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As the pluralist model would predict, the bureaucrats, politicians and
representatives of citizens groups involved in this case study expressed views and
recommended alternatives that reflected the commonly held concepts of liberty,
economic freedom, pursuit of happiness and formalized access to the political process.
But also, IRPAC and District and SNWA staff members worried about legitimating their
actions to the larger community. There was much discussion during the ERPAC meetings
that the public needs to be sold on the various proposals they are debating. Yet, the
debate usually focused on the voters as having the final say at election time and that
elected officials must be given reasonable courses of legislative action to pursue.
The recommendation to build the TTF to accommodate additional water capacity
for the region came out of the IRPAC meetings. Pluralists would argue that this outcome
came at the end of open, public discussion of the issues involved and through
competition of interests of the groups represented by the IRPAC members. The pluralist
model would highlight the shifting alliances seen during the IRPAC meeting on various
issues discussed leading up to the decision to build the additional facility. Due to the
open, public setting of the IRPAC board and due to the varied representation of
community interests, the pluralist model would argue that this outcome did not express
bias toward any one segment of the community. Rather, this policy outcome was created
by a thorough and competitive weighing of policy options by interested community
groups, forging a compromise that will ultimately serve the best interests of the
community at large.
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Since the pluralist model measures participation in policy at the individual level
of power, it overlooks the structural reasons that might preclude participation by other
segments of a community. Few working class people would be able to afford the time to
commit to a year of meetings. Also, while the meetings were open to the public, neither
the District nor the SNWA went to great lengths to advertise them to the public. In fact,
according to IRPAC literature, the meetings are for the members to become educated and
to discuss alternatives among themselves and not to engage in active public debate over
the issues.
Further, the pluralist model does not consider the degree to which this forum is
controlled by the bureaucrats at the District and the SNWA. The level of expertise
involved in understanding and developing alternatives is tremendous. Discussions of
conservation measures brings into play issues o f water law at the federal, state and local
levels, government regulation of individual behavior and marginal cost estimates o f
spending money on new water vs. spending money to spread old water resources over a
greater number of users. The panel’s discussions serve as a gauge of public reaction and
acceptability of various proposals rather than as a generator of alternatives out of a
competitive, non-hierarchical policy forum.

Elite/Managerial Model
As this model would predict, there was evidence of a high degree of elite and
bureaucratic involvement. The involvement of the general public is limited and highly
controlled by the agencies directly charged with water management. The lack of media
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coverage speaks to the elite/managerial expectation that elite/managerial unity and
dominance would prevail. The District’s decision to pursue the ERP model in
conjunction with the SNWA has not garnered the intense negative reaction that
accompanied the proposal to secure northern water rights. The decision to pursue the
construction of additional water capacity in the phased building o f the TTF does follow
the elite/managerial expectations of outcomes favoring dominant economic and
bureaucratic interests as this outcome will increase the economic potential of the region
and the power of the District as the main force behind the SNWA. The outcome reflects
the District’s increasing prominence in the region as well as reflecting the interests the
resort and construction/real estate industries have in maintaining their economic
dominance. In many ways, the District and those who stand to benefit from increased
water supply and management have taken great pains to ‘educate’ the public before
taking any specific actions. ERP models have great progressive potential within their
design, stressing as it does a high level of public participation. However, the District has
introduced the public into the IRP process in very carefully measured doses to this
process.
The IRP process may prove to be a form of “pseudo participation” (lacofano
1990:34) where the illusion of participation is orchestrated to appease citizen groups and
rate and taxpayers. All of the policy recommendations and alternatives have been
generated by the District, the ERPAC citizens process was one of education. The various
financial and development interests represented on the IRPAC panel along with the two
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representatives of low income and environmental interests reviewed the alternatives in
the light of their political viability with the larger community.
With regard to the managerial and elite theories, the composition of the local
political boards, agencies and the ERPAC citizen’s advisory board, the policy process
displays a great deal of overlapping of managerial and elite involvement. Only 2 of the
21 members of IRPAC represent environmental or low-income interests. The other 19
are members of the business elite or are dependent upon continued population and/or
economic growth. Few minorities or women sit on IRPAC. It might be argued from this
perspective that the water policy is being laid at the disposal of local business elites and
governmental officials with close business ties.
However, the elite/managerial model fails to accommodate the dissension among
the local elites. Observations o f ERPAC meetings showed a clear split among those elite
interests with the most to gain by increasing the regions water supplies. While the
consensus of IRPAC was to bring more water into the valley and constructing a facility to
accommodate that increased supply, paying for that infrastructure became a contentious
matter. IRPAC members representing environmental and consumer interest voiced
concern along with representatives from the smaller cities, that this TTF project, if built
at all, should be built in phases in case the increased growth projections prove false. The
concern was to protect long-standing residents from gambling on continued phenomenal
growth increases. The only two immediate sources of increased revenue for the District
and the SNWA are that of monthly rates and connection fees. Any other type of revenue
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source, such as sales tax increases or room tax increases, must pass a vote by the
legislature or a referendum by the voters of the region. Members of IRPAC with
construction and development interests balked at the discussion of increasing connection
fees. They contended that everyone profits from growth, that the cormection fee would
simply be passed along to the new homebuyer and that increased cost would drive home
prices beyond the reach of low and moderate income families. The resort industry
representative, Richard Bunker made clear that those profiting from growth would have
to pay some portion of the costs of new infrastructure and that the resorts would not
accept any financing plan which would emphasize rate increases and taxes that only
effected the resort industry, such as a room tax. Financing issues proved so contentious
that they were held over to the next phase of IRPAC meetings in 1996.
Also, this perspective does not fully appreciate the nature of the discrepancies of
opinion regarding this issue that have emerged. The IRP model was adopted in the wake
of a protest from a wide spectrum of community members. There has been some attempt
to involve non-business interests in the policy formation process. The overriding
authority of the federal government plays against a pure manipulation of the process for
the benefit of the local elites. The local elites cannot control the Interior Department as
easily as they can the membership of an advisory board.
Again, this elite/managerial model fails to account for the fact that the demands
that neighboring states and communities are placing on the same scarce resource keep the
District and economic elites in Southern Nevada from invariably getting their way.
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While there has been much discussion among all o f the states dependent upon the waters
of the Colorado to reopen the compact and renegotiate the very principles of
appropriative rights upon which the compact is based historically, it has been difficult to
take back a claim to water that is already being used by a population center. So it is not
surprising that upper basin states are leery of lending water to lower basin states,
especially to Nevada which has demonstrated little effort to manage its present supply in
the most efficient (read: conserving against waste) way.
The District continues to grant commitments for future use of water for
development far in advance creating what is known as a “paper demand” or “paper
shortage.” The District stressed throughout the IRPAC meetings and again at the
presentation of recommendations at the SNWA Board meeting that the commitments
must be brought closer to actual use if we intend to be taken seriously in negotiations
with other water purveyors locally and throughout the Colorado basins.
California and Arizona are both committed to population growth to maintain their
tax bases and to promote their construction industries. Also, Arizona is deeply suspicious
of both of its sister states in the lower basin. California and Arizona have been a legal
logjams since the initial division of water allotments along the Colorado in 1922 (Reisner
and Bates 1990). Arizona was the only state of either basin to fail to sign the Colorado
River water compact at the time of its ratification and is in the middle of many ongoing
legal actions concerning the details of that compact. Arizona is also concerned that while
it has forced to conserve in order to accommodate growth, that Nevada will continue to
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use water wastefully while pursuing a strategy against Arizona’s allotment similar to that
of California-put the water to use in a major metropolitan area then refuse to return it
based upon the human costs of returning it (Associated Press 1995;4B). As much as
technical expertise and elite demands for growth are important to this process, this
theoretical model does not adequately accommodate the lack o f elite and bureaucratic
unity beyond the region.
This model also fails to factor in the lack of elite/managerial support for this
policy from the federal levels. The proposed Treatment and Transmission Facility will,
according to Richard Wimmer, deputy general manager of the Las Vegas Valley Water
District, be the largest infrastructure project undertaken without federal assistance.
Clearly, the West had historically been the beneficiary of federal policy and funds to
promote economic development of water resources. That federal funding is no longer
forthcoming speaks to a change in federal policy away fi-om exploitation of natural
resources to protection of them. This federal policy shift was significantly influenced by
activist segments of the general public pressuring the federal government to create laws
such as the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act during the late 1960s and
1970s.
While this policy move exhibits a high degree of elite involvement the adoption
of a policy making model that incorporates a wide segment of the public interest groups
speaks to the impact that non-elite groups have through the political system. The IRPAC
board includes outspoken critics o f the District’s previous policies such as Chris Brown,
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formerly of the environmental activist group. Citizen Alert along with representatives
from the resort industry. However, since the pluralist perspective did not adequately
model the outcome of the District’s latest policy, the pressure to accommodate divergent
political positions may come from institutional contradictions and class conflict.

Class-Dialectic Model
This decision making model has evolved from changes in the policy context in
which utility planners must work. “The key changes in context include rapidly
increasing urban demands, mounting environmental concerns, the skyrocketing cost of
developing supply, consumptive uses, the high cost of compliance with water quality
regulations, changing political and institutional constraints, an increasing conservation
ethic, changing public perceptions about the role of water supply agencies and a high
degree of uncertainty about what the future will bring in all these areas” (Fiske and Dong
1995:72).
The IRP model can provide a mechanism whereby an agency can pay attention to
community values and the concrete manifestations of those values. This model can
provide the structure for a forward-looking resource policy if the community is already
sufficiently motivated and conscious. But a progressive outcome is not guaranteed. The
District may be finding that this particular decision making model better amplifies the
possible conflicts within economic constituencies and provides a mechanism for their
amelioration in a manner that does not incite open protest or give rise to behind the
scenes maneuvering. This decision making model purposefully requires that a given
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agency using this model openly discuss and prioritize the costs and benefits of a given
policy in the light of the values expressed by the community at large. In this way, the
model can serve the development/construction/resort interests while helping to devise
concrete financing and resources options that provide for a wider variety of those
interests. The IRP model solves many of the problems that plagued the earlier resource
plan (the CWP) of the District and still serves the interests o f the dominant class. The
IRP model also accommodates the co-optation of non-elite interests.
This outcome to build the TTF does show evidence o f biases in social institutions
toward dominant economic interests, latent intraclass conflict, political alliances that are
contingent upon the resolution of conflicts and outcomes that favor dominant interests,
but also reflects opposition from non-elites. The outcome demonstrates that population
and economic growth are central to the politics of water planning in the Southern Nevada
region. The TTF allows for a significant increase in water supply capacity to be handled
by the region. The decision to phase in the TTF construction and the decision to defer
financing the TTF demonstrated the conflicts within the IRPAC interests. The political
alliances of the individual members of ERPAC reflect the potential alliances possible in
the public at large and are contingent upon the particular issue at hand. The fact that
resort industry representative Richard Bunker fights to protect the basic rate for water in
IRPAC meetings, demonstrates that the resort industry might align itself with consumer
protection groups and other non-elite interests to fight a financing proposal that affects
the resort industry despite the fact that the resort industry stands to gain by bringing
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greater water treatment and transmission capacity to the region. And lastly, the TTF
decision coming as it did in a forum which attempted to integrate non-elite interests such
as consumer protection and concerns for the environment, is evidence of the classdialectic expectation that outcomes generally favor dominant interests, but that the
outcomes will also reflect the power o f non-elite interests and the limitations imposed by
structural contradictions. Despite the strong evidence to support the hypotheses of the
class-dialectic model, there was still no evidence to support the existence of class conflict
expressly in the form of worker/capitalist conflict.
In sum, while the evidence follows many of the predictions of the class-dialectic
model, such as the evidence of intraclass conflict and overall bias toward the dominant
economic class, the prediction of interclass conflict was unfounded by the evidence. The
class-dialectic model was most efficient in parsing out the contradictory behaviors and
actions o f individual members of the various segments of the capital class, however, its
central concept of interclass conflict expressed only in the form of worker/capitalist
conflict leaves the model wanting. There may be other forms of opposition to the
institution of capitalism that do not engender classic class conflict

ANALYSIS OF POLICY TRENDS

Taken as a whole, what does the examination of a series of public policy
decisions say about the relative explanatory powers of each of the theoretical models:
pluralism, elite/managerial and class-dialectic?
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Pluralist Model
This model concentrates on players and outcomes of specific policies. While
weak on historical and political context, the model provides empirical evidence such as
the names of the individuals and groups who were recognized by the media to have been
involved in the policy process as well as drawing out the specific policy actions and
outcomes recorded in the press and in government documents, that strengthens an
otherwise abstract discussion of policy. Each policy decision reinforced the bias in the
major institutions toward perpetuating economic and population growth.
One thing the decisional pluralist model does not investigate is who did not
participate and why. The federal government did not offer to pay or share the costs of the
CWP, a project that might have been funded without a debate twenty or even ten years
ago. The federal government was, however, willing to negotiate with the District as part
of a regional authority to facilitate regional and cooperative solutions to water supply
problems of growing urban areas. This shows the result of two trends; The reluctance of
the federal government to engage in large-scale water development projects in the face of
growing concern over deficit spending and existing environmental regulation. The other
trend is that the federal government is starting to recognize the needs of urban western
users o f water controlled by their resource agencies. The mission of the Bureau of
Reclamation had been to turn desert wastelands into verdant farmlands, to reclaim the
desert fi’om drought. The Department o f the Interior and its agency the Bureau of
Reclamation had divided up shares of Colorado River water based on the agricultural
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potential of the upper and lower basin states. Nevada received the smallest
apportionment, yet has arguably been one of the better investments in the West. The
resort industry in Las Vegas uses a fraction of the water that desert agricultural practices
consume, yet the resort industry in Las Vegas has produced one of the strongest
economies in the West paying better wages than other resort industries in other states
(Christensen 1995:15). The District is at the heart of a movement to change traditional
thinking about the Colorado River and the uses to which its water is put. Some who
thought the Law of the River would never be changed have decided to hedge their bets.
(Wheeler 1996:10).
This model is also weak on questioning what options were left out of policy
decisions. Could there have been other popular, bureaucratic or institutional responses to
managing the area’s water supplies? To managing population growth? Since water is so
very scarce in the West and particularly in the Las Vegas Valley, should public policy
encourage population growth at the risk of creating shortage situations? Since the
pluralist model only examines specific behaviors and outcomes of particular political
issues, the analysis fails to look at related issues that may impact on the interpretation of
the findings.

Elite/Managerial Model
The elite/managerial model analysis focuses on the degree to which public policy
is made by and for economic and bureaucratic elites. An overview of the series of policy
steps taken by the District does bear out a strong elite bias. Las Vegas is the site of one
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of the most vibrant economies in the West While relatively small compared to Los
Angeles or even Phoenix, the District, led by general manager Patricia Mulroy has
commanded attention throughout the southwest She is unabashedly in favor of
providing the water resources to keep the local economy booming. The members of local
commissions and councils as well as lobbyists for business interests and owners of major
development companies have all participated to some degree in influencing or forming
water policy over the 1989 -1995 period. This model clearly exposes bias in the policy
process in favor of economic elites and strengthened bureaucratic control.
However, the elite/managerial model falls short when accounting for the
opposition to the CWP. Even taking the policy steps that followed, the elite/managerial
model ignores or does not adequately explain the conflicts between the Las Vegas Valley
purveyors or of the conflicts between members of the economic elite that surfaced during
the IRPAC meetings.
This model illuminates overlaps and interconnections between the agencies
charged with managing public policy and the economic interests that stand to gain by
policy which is favorable to their needs. The model has a strong empirical component,
but it does little to explain those findings which show that non-elite interests played a
role in influencing public policy.

Class-Dialectic Model
The class-dialectic, generates hypotheses which attempt to explain the
institutional and systemic confluence and contradictions informing public policy.
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Talking about institutions and their dictates is easier than pointing to one in a specific
policy setting. The use of pluralist and elite/managerial techniques and theoretical
hypotheses helps to put flesh on an otherwise abstract and amorphous argument.
Looking over the series of policy steps, the class-dialectic hypotheses hold up.
Overall the interests of population and economic growth won out. The policy shift to the
IRP model simultaneously accommodates oppositional interests while succeeding in
bringing more water supplies to the area and more power to the District whereas the
more traditional, bureaucratic and economic elite-driven policy move of pursuing the
CWP failed. The shift dealt with the organizational and institutional contradictions that
had become apparent with the crisis of water supply. The CWP, while roundly criticized
and currently deferred, should not be considered a failure for dominant class interests.
The criticism, the view of District general manager Pat Mulroy, aided the District in their
mission. “I don’t think we would have gotten attention to southern Nevada’s needs
without the outpouring of concerns on those [CWP] applications” (Christensen 1994:12).
The CWP still looms in the background of District policy. Jon Christensen reporting for
High Country News, writes:
As Las Vegas has boomed in recent years, so has the power of [Mulroy’s]
agency. It merged over the past few years with several competing water districts,
and now serves 900,000 people, 65 percent of the state’s population.
Mulroy is throwing that power into changing how the Colorado River is
managed. If she can get access to Colorado River water for Las Vegas, Mulroy is
offering to abandon one o f the biggest urban water grabs in Western history. The
move puts Las Vegas at the center of reforms that are changing the way water is
managed throughout the West. And it may unite her urban constituency and
environmentalists against traditional water interests (Christensen 1994:12).
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Despite the increasing power accorded to the District, an examination of the
evidence demonstrated that its actions were constrained throughout the series of policy
steps by existing law, traditional water policy in the West, environmental laws,
environmental activists, and by competition with other bureaucracies within the state and
within surrounding states. The policy shift did develop new alternatives and integrated
the public as a political force. Population and economic growth continue in the Las
Vegas Valley, but not without acknowledging the political costs of such growth. The one
class-dialectic hypothesis that did not hold up under the weight of the data was that
hypothesis which anticipated signs of interclass conflict. In the next chapter, I will
discuss possible reasons for this occurrences. Also, I will offer some conclusions about
the merits of a study using a mixture of theoretical models and some issues for further
research.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

Embarking upon this research, I set out to more clearly understand the socio
political and economic factors affecting natural resource public policy. I chose to
examine the policy decisions o f the Las Vegas Valley Water District during the period of
1989 to 1995 using a theoretical foundation which contrasted models from the pluralist,
elite/managerial and class-dialectic perspectives. Evidence gathered through first-hand
observation and interviews along with findings culled from secondary media accounts
and other relevant sources proved a rich source of data for testing the explanatory powers
of the individual theories and for making the argument that the pluralist, elite/managerial
and class-dialectic models work best in concert. A review of the major findings reveals
elements important to all three perspectives: interested individuals acting within pressure
politics, bureaucracies acting on their own mandates, and the goals and demands of
major social institutions producing contradictory outcomes yet biased toward dominant
economic interests. Also, looking at a series of decisions and outcomes within a
particular policy setting allowed for a more fhiitful comparison of the differing strengths
and weaknesses of these theoretical models.
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In 1989, the District filed claims on unallocated ground and surface water in the

state o f Nevada. District officials claimed at the time it was the only option open to the
District to prevent water shortages in the Las Vegas Valley. By 1995, the District had
consolidated its power with other local purveyors and has secured additional Colorado
River water and is currently finalizing plans to construct a new treatment and
transmission facility at Lake Mead in order to accommodate the new supplies of water.
Taken as a policy trend, the District proved to be a nimble player in the effort to secure
additional water supplies for the region. At the agency level, the District shifted its
policy from traditional supply-oriented planning that involved mounting large-scale water
impounding and importation projects to one which incorporated conservation and
environmental concerns and initiated innovations in water policy regarding Colorado
River water.
This present case study of public policy regarding water resources touches upon
the dynamic effects of capitalist growth and democratic institutions. Population and
economic growth in the Southern Nevada region are responsible for the area’s positive
employment outlook. Unemployment figures are routinely below national averages and
the region is home to one of the highest paying service economies in the West
(Christensen 1995; 15). On the other hand, the rapid population and economic growth has
run ahead of infrastructure and governmental services. Paying for that infrastructure will
most likely flatten the economic and population growth in the area, but paying for the
massive upgrades in roads and schools and other infrastructure items will come at a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

115
higher cost than had the region grown more slowly (Kerr 1989c;3A). Providing and
paying for the infrastructure to supply this growing region with water will be at the center
of public policy for some time to come.
The policy cycle revealed a strong bias toward interests of economic and
population growth. District officials along with Clark County government officials were
quoted as saying that growth in Clark County could not and would not be stopped. Paul
Christensen, a Clark County Commissioner and Las Vegas Valley Water District Board
Chairman pleaded, “I don’t think you can legally or morally restrict growth” when
discussing the District’s applications for rural ground and surface waters (Pappa
1990g:5A). So while the CWP did not immediately provide the Southern Nevada area
with additional water it did not dry up the resolve of the District to meet the water
demands of increased population growth as voiced most strongly by District
spokespeople such as Paul Christensen.
Moreover, a review of the history of water policy in the West and in Nevada
demonstrates that the bias toward development of water resources for economic and
population growth are deeply entrenched in the social, legal, and political landscape.
This history also highlights the complexity of the policy process. There are a number of
governmental agencies on the federal, state and local levels weighing in with authority
over water resources. Any research into water policy must take these factors into account
as the findings in this case study show.
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The Las Vegas Valley Water District’s policy cycle demonstrates the changing
trends in Western water policy regarding the economic uses to which water should be
placed. Much of standing water policy is governed by laws and concepts bom in the
nineteenth century. The research indicates that changing economic dynamics are
influencing changes in management of water resources. Water sustains the growth o f
various economic activities. If agriculturists grow crops with their share of water and
grazers cattle with theirs, then urban developers grow people with theirs. This is an
important consideration in that it is one thing to develop water supplies to meet the short
term needs of population growth, but it is another to provide for their long-term viability.
Economics and politics have shifted away from traditional agricultural uses o f scarce
water resources and now seem to be moving in favor of service powerhouses such as Las
Vegas.
The movement from the Cooperative Water Project to the Integrated Resource
Planning model bear out the evidence of the stresses of rapid economic and population
growth against a changing financial background. The costs both economically and
politically of large-scale resource diversion project have highlighted the contradictions
inherent in capital accumulation. Pursuing traditional importation or impounding
projects in the West have enormous costs which had formerly been shouldered by the
federal government and the taxpayers of the nation as a whole. The District’s CWP plan
would have spread the costs over the local ratepayers and the developers as well as rural
county residents. Also, state bonds would have been raised making the rest o f the state
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pay for water projects whose benefits they will realize only indirectly if at all. While it is
difficult to organize an effective national opposition to spending for large-scale water
projects, it is much easier to organize protest against projects to be funded on a local
level, especially in light of the relative homogeneity of the rural counties.
Each of the models offers a different level o f analysis which illuminates a
different level of power. The findings of this research confirm the existence of
individuals, organizations and institutions leaving evidence of their influence upon the
policy outcomes. The pluralist model predicted interest group participation and the
findings did indicate signs of pressure group politics. However, the actions of the
interests groups could not be shown to be definitive in predicting the outcomes o f the
District’s policy decisions.
On the organizational level, the elite/managerial model did highlight findings
that indicated a high degree of elite and bureaucratic participation in policy initiation and
formation. Still, the evidence did not find conclusively that the policy outcomes were the
result of actions taken by a cohesive and self-conscious economic and bureaucratic elite
to further their interests. The analysis suggested that competition among elites and
bureaucracies was more prevalent than agreement and coordination.
Working on the systemic level, the class-dialectic model offers hypotheses that
expose institutional forces at work behind policy decisions. Indeed, the evidence in this
case study supports many of the propositions of finding historically contingent political
alliances, intraclass struggle often mitigated through inner circle mechanisms such as the
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Integrated Resource Planning Advisory Committee, and outcomes that typically favor
dominant economic interests while reflecting the power of subordinant interests and
constraints of structural contradictions.
However, the prediction of finding evidence of class conflict between worker and
capitalist class interests did not emerge in this analysis. There could be two reasons for
this condition: ( 1) that under boom economic conditions, workers identify their interests
as being one with those of the capital class; or (2) that class conflict, e.g. conflict arising
out of the contradictions inherent to capital accumulation needs to be recast to include
such subordinate interests as the protection of the natural environment from economic
exploitation. This research clearly suggests that only evidence of substantial challenge to
the institutional conditions of economic and population development came from activist
identifying themselves with environmental causes not from workers identifying
themselves in conflict with capitalists.
It may prove with further research and development of class-dialectic models that
the environment itself, with its physical properties and limitations, should be
incorporated into research designs and hypotheses involving public policy centered on
natural resource use. The evidence in these case studies suggests that the environment is
indeed undertheorized. The one other theme that runs in lock step with that of economic
growth in this set o f policy decisions is the scarcity of water itself.
The failure o f any of the three models to fully capture important political factors
and predict outcomes may stem from the lack of treatment of environmental factors.
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The environment is not included in any way in any o f the three models. While Whitt,
Kleniewski, McGuire, Dahl and others discuss the factors delimiting political and
economic activities within policy areas that clearly touch upon natural resource issues,
little or no theoretical importance is accorded to the natural environment as an analytic
tool. Environmental sociology is a burgeoning field o f sociological study. Riley E.
Dunlap and William R. Catton, Jr. have made significant contributions to sociology in
general and to the development of environmental sociology in particular (Freudenburg
and Gramling 1989:439). “[T]he field of environmental sociology [is] the ‘study o f
social-environmental interactions,’ emphasizing not only that humans have an impact on
the physical environment, but that environmental conditions (such as energy supplies)
also affect humans and human societies” (Freudenburg and Gramling 1989:444). Their
work has pointed the way for using the environment as an important analytic tool for
appraising the disequilibrium and irrationality of a great number of our public policies
and debates. The physical environment does prove to be limiting, even to self-interested
individuals, bureaucratic elites and the demands of capital.
The politics of this valley shape both the social and the natural environments.
Water as a resource for human use is of vital importance. Water is so scarce in this area
that disputes over its allocation resulted in shooting wars during the nineteenth century.
Technology has dramatically changed the amount and the delivery of water to this arid
region, but technology has not resolved the political problems that stem from allocation
of that water. Technology has allowed social resources to be directed towards population
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and economic growth. While a few profit by this social allocation, all members o f
society are touched by its consequences. The analysis also suggests that the environment
should be studied as a catalyst in pushing policy formation. The physical environment,
while not an impasse to human technology and social organization, possesses obdurate
physical properties which constrain and influence social activities such as making public
policy. The policy crisis was due in part to physical limitations of water supplies while
not determined by them.
In order to pay for the increasingly complicated technological delivery systems
more people must be drawn to the valley to help pay the costs of growth, necessitating
more population growth, etc. Looking at the politics o f water, one can see the negative
consequences are pushed off further and further down the line. At some point there will
come an end, either through technological failure or economics, but behind that endpoint
will lurk the politics o f social allocation. Who or what (i.e., the wildlife and flora) will
pay for continued population growth and who will benefit?
The environment is an important key to understanding policy making, particularly
in the West. Freshwater is a physical entity that is oftentimes located far from Western
population centers. This is especially true in Las Vegas. Human activity of the most
rudimentary form cannot continue without access to clean, stable sources of potable
water. Less than 1% o f the earth’s water supplies are available for human consumption
(Bock 1990:3).
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Water as a resource is renewable - to a point. Water cycles in a pattern of
evaporation and precipitation. The science of hydrology studies those patterns and
determines the amount of water in a given area. When the water supply available to a
particular area is exceeded as it is in Las Vegas, technological policy come into play.
Dam projects impound water behind mammoth cement walls and pipelines and canals
channel water to far away destinations.
The journal. Capitalism, Nature and Socialism is devoted to exploring the link
between the corrosive aspects of capitalism upon both the social and physical
environments. In article after article, the case is made that analysis of environmental
issues without a critique of capitalism is fruitless, as is any analysis of capitalist issues
without a critique o f environmentalism. Red-Green politics seek to uncover the links
between environmental and social disequilibriums caused by capitalist institutions. More
and more articles are being published in radical and liberal magazines, such as Z, Mother
Jones^ In These Times, and The Nation, tying together the environment and issues of
social justice and politics.
While it is difficult to encompass all possible points of contact on a particular
public policy, it is paramount to consider that more than economic or political
determinism could and is most likely at work. The policy decisions taken by the District
did occur primarily in the political-economic arena and those factors should be at the
center of attention. However, the analysis of limiting and motivating factors leading up
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to those policy decisions may prove to be weak if it does not recognize the inter
relationship that humans have with their physical environment.
By paying attention to the many levels on which power is manifested (individual,
bureaucratic and systemic) a stronger analysis of public policy emerges. The
comparative study of the policy changes of the Las Vegas Valley Water District between
1989 and 1995 demonstrate clearly that political interests and policy outcomes have
contradictory explanations. These contradictions put flesh on the otherwise abstract
argument made by theorists of the systemic school. Capitalism doesn’t do things, not in
the strict sense, but showing only the outcomes of decisions and naming the parties
involved paints a very shallow picture indeed. The study highlights on the individual,
organizational and systemic level that a shift in power is going on all three levels.
Formerly, farmers and miners were the central economic elite groups in Western
water policy. Now, the resort industry is fast becoming a central player in Western water
policy. The rapid population influx to resort-based cities such as Las Vegas has tipped
the political edge to urban areas. The Clark County, home to Las Vegas, dwarfs the rest
of state in terms of revenue contributions to the state coffers. And as the population
increase continues, the southern Nevada county threatens to dwarf the rest of the state in
terms of political clout. This shift from agricultural, grazing and mining activities to
service economies is reflected throughout the West. Nevada is at the forefront of this
change, ironically, because of its historic deficiencies as an agricultural producer. The
state’s water agencies do not have as powerful or as entrenched agricultural interests to
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battle and can, therefore, take bold initiatives to push Western water policy in the
direction of serving urban service economies.
Further research is needed to determine the importance of the environment as an
independent factor in public policy outcomes. Conflicts and crises surrounding
environmental quality may push the Las Vegas Valley Water District’s use of the
Integrated Resource Planning model in to one of two directions: (1) The District may
find that the ERF model diffuses conflict and controversy and proves to be a mechanism
of consensus that Schattschneider (1960) feels maintains conflict at an individual rather
than socialized level; thereby, limiting the political efficacy of the process in the interests
of ordinary citizens. Or, (2) the IRP model could prove to be a mechanism whereby
ordinary people can make history in the sense that Flacks (1988) discusses. As the IRP
model matures, it could prove to be a mechanism for ordinary citizens to participate in
policy making rather than merely policy reaction. The interplay between environmental
quality and capital accumulation may push the issue of growth to the fore long before a
worker/capitalist split will due to the fact that the costs both monetary and aesthetic of
continued economic and population growth in the Las Vegas Valley are coming due more
quickly than would occur in a more humid area or in an area where growth was occurring
more slowly. Considering the boom economic conditions currently operating in the area,
the limits and costs of water supply loom large over the horizon and should be pursued in
greater theoretical detail as they impact the social construction of natural resource public
policy.
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APPENDIX 2

Table of IRPAC Members
Name

Earl Burris
Danny Thompson
Jeff Van He
Kenny Bams

Occupation
Director o f Campaign for Southern
Nevada’s Future
Community activist
Labor Activist
EPA Engineer
Banker

Ysidro Barron
Robert Broadbent
Mark Brown
Paula Brown
Richard Bunker
Bob Campbell
Caesar Caviglia
Russ Dorn
John Guedry

Architect
Director McCarran Airport
Real Estate Developer
Small Business Owner
Lobbyist for resort industry
Real Estate Developer
Highway Construction
Real Estate Developer
Not stated

Brent Hardy
Roger Harris
Craig Kadlub

Small Business Owner
Not stated
Landscape Business

Robert Lewis
Bill Martin
Mike Saltman
Dan Stewart

Real Estate Developer
Banker
Real Estate Developer
Industrialist

Chris Brown

Area o f Represention
Environmenal and social
justice issues
Boulder City
Union interests
Environmental interests
Black Chamber o f
Commerce
Henderson
Clark County
Summerlin
Small business interests
Resort interests
Henderson
Henderson
Henderson
Clark County School
District
North Las Vegas
Not stated
Landscape industry
interests
Las Vegas
Coalition 2000*
Commercial Development
Henderson industries

The information for this table was provided by Judies Brailsford a staff member o f the SNWA Technical
Work Group working on the implementation o f the IRP/IRPAC process.
♦Coalition 2000 is a joint project between the District and private businesses to educate the public regarding
conservation issues.
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